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INDIVIDUAL FAIRNESS IN PIPELINES
CYNTHIA DWORK∗, CHRISTINA ILVENTO∗∗, AND MEENA JAGADEESAN∗∗∗
ABSTRACT. It is well understood that a system built from individually fair components may not itself be indi-
vidually fair. In this work, we investigate individual fairness under pipeline composition. Pipelines differ from
ordinary sequential or repeated composition in that individuals may drop out at any stage, and classification in
subsequent stages may depend on the remaining “cohort” of individuals. As an example, a company might hire
a team for a new project and at a later point promote the highest performer on the team. Unlike other repeated
classification settings, where the degree of unfairness degrades gracefully over multiple fair steps, the degree
of unfairness in pipelines can be arbitrary, even in a pipeline with just two stages.
Guided by a panoply of real-world examples, we provide a rigorous framework for evaluating different types
of fairness guarantees for pipelines. We show that naı¨ve auditing is unable to uncover systematic unfairness
and that, in order to ensure fairness, some form of dependence must exist between the design of algorithms at
different stages in the pipeline. Finally, we provide constructions that permit flexibility at later stages, meaning
that there is no need to lock in the entire pipeline at the time that the early stage is constructed.
1. INTRODUCTION
As algorithms reach ever more deeply into our daily lives, there is increasing concern that they be fair.
The study of the theory of algorithmic fairness was initiated by Dwork et al. [5], who introduced the solu-
tion concept of individual fairness. Roughly speaking, individual fairness requires that similar individuals
receive similar distributions on outcomes. Dwork and Ilvento [6] examined the behavior of individual fair-
ness (and various group notions of fairness) under composition. They showed that although competitive
composition, i.e. when two different tasks “compete” for individuals, can result in arbitrarily bad behavior
under composition, fairness under simple repeated or sequential classifications (for the same task) degrades
gracefully, similar to degradation of differential privacy loss under multiple computations.1 In this work we
expand the investigation of individual fairness under sequential composition to the case of cohort pipelines.
Cohort pipelines differ from ordinary sequential composition in that each stage of the pipeline considers
only the remaining cohort of individuals and may change its classification strategy conditioned on the set of
individuals remaining.
Cohort pipelines are common: many data-driven systems consist of a sequence of cohort selection or
filtering steps, followed by decision or scoring steps. A running exemplary scenario in this work will be a
two-stage cohort pipeline: a company hires a team (cohort) of individuals to work on a project and subse-
quently promotes the highest performer on the team to a leadership position. Although the team selection
may be fair in the sense that similarly qualified candidates have similar chances of being chosen for the
team, the selection of the highest performer critically depends on the other members of the team. As we will
see, being compared fairly to other members of the cohort in each stage doesn’t imply fairness of the entire
pipeline, as the competitive landscape can vary between similar individuals.
Indeed, a fair cohort selection mechanism [6] can exploit the “myopic” nature of the promotion stage
to skew overall fairness. This can happen either through good intentions (e.g., choosing teams so that
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1Note that although fairness degrades gracefully in these scenarios, it does not rule out the existence of feedback loops which
arbitrarily amplify unfairness, see e.g. [12, 20].
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members of a minority group always have a mentor on the team) or malice (e.g., ensuring that minority
candidates are almost always paired with a more qualified majority candidate): in both these cases minorities
suffer significantly reduced chances of promotion.2 Unlike other repeated classification settings in which the
degree of unfairness of multiple fair steps degrades gracefully, the degree of unfairness in cohort pipelines
can be arbitrary, even in a pipeline with just two stages. Furthermore, we demonstrate that construction
of malicious pipelines under naı¨ve auditing of fairness is straightforward and both computationally and
practically feasible.
In this work we examine the subtle issues that arise in cohort-based pipelines, focusing on short pipelines
consisting of a single cohort selection step followed by a scoring step. We formalize fairness desiderata
capturing the issues unique to pipelines (not shared by ordinary sequential composition), and give construc-
tions for robust cohort selection mechanisms that behave well under (i.e., are robust to) pipeline composition
with a variety of future scoring policies. In particular, we demonstrate that it is possible to design cohort
selection mechanisms that are robust to a rich family of subsequent scoring functions given a simple descrip-
tion of a policy governing the behavior of the family.3 This provides, for example, a means for enabling a
company to choose an individually fair hiring procedure that will be robust to many possible compensation
functions (all adhering to the policy) chosen at a later date. Guided by a panoply of real-world examples,
this work provides a rigorous framework for evaluating and ensuring different types of fairness guarantees
for pipelines.
We now summarize our contributions. First, we formalize what it means for the outcomes of a pipeline,
which include both the outcome of the initial cohort selection step and the score conditioned on being
chosen, to be fair.4 We then extend this fairness notion to describe how a cohort selection mechanism
can be robust to a scoring policy, i.e. to compose fairly with any cohort scoring function chosen from a
permissible set. Although the choice of scoring function may not depend on the cohort, the scores assigned
to any individual may be highly dependent on their cohort “context.” Second, we determine how the scoring
policy imposes conditions on the cohort selection mechanism. In particular, we show that there is a natural
way to describe the set of cohort contexts in which similar individuals are treated similarly by all functions
permitted by the policy, and we demonstrate that assigning similar individuals to similar distributions over
cohort contexts is sufficient (and sometimes necessary) to ensure pipeline robustness. Third, we provide
constructions for cohort selection mechanisms which are both robust to a rich set of practical scoring policies
and permit flexibility in selection of the original cohort.
2. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
2.1. Preliminaries. We base our model on individual fairness, as proposed in [5]. The intuition behind
individual fairness is that “similar individuals should be treated similarly.” What constitutes similarity for a
particular classification task is provided by a metric which captures society’s best understanding of who is
similar to whom. Below we formally define individual fairness as in [5] with a natural Lipschitz relaxation.
Definition 2.1 (α-Individual Fairness [5]). Given a universe of individuals U , and a metric D :U ×U →
[0,1] for a classification task with outcome set O, and a distance metric d : ∆(O)× ∆(O) → [0,1] over
distributions over outcomes, a randomized classifier C :U → ∆(O) is α−individually fair if and only if for
all u,v ∈U , d(C(u),C(v)) ≤ αD(u,v).
We use the phrase “similar individuals are treated similarly” as a shorthand for the individual fairness
Lipschitz condition. Individual fairness was originally proposed in the context of independent classification,
i.e. each individual is classified exactly once, independently of all others. However, in many practical
settings individuals cannot be classified independently, particularly when there are a limited number of
positive classifications available (e.g. a university which can only accept a limited number of students
2See Appendix A for additional examples.
3Formally, we can think of a policy as a description of a set of permitted scoring functions.
4Bower et al. consider fairness in pipelines for a group-based definition of fairness, and primarily consider the accuracy of the final
pipeline decision [1].
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Term Definition
U The universe of individuals
D :U ×U → [0,1] The individual fairness metric
C ⊆ Pow(U)\ /0 The set of permissible cohorts
F The family of permitted scoring functions.
f : C ×U → [0,1] A scoring function. f (C,x) is undefined whenever x /∈ C, and throughout this work,
whenever we write f (C,x), where x is any element inU , it is the case that x ∈C.
A :U → C An individually fair cohort selection mechanism.
A(C) ∈ [0,1] The probability that A outputs the cohort C.
Cu ⊆ C The subset of permissible cohorts containing u.
p(u) ∈ [0,1] The probability A outputs a cohort containing U .
TABLE 1. Terminology
each year, an advertiser with a limited budget). Dwork and Ilvento formalized this problem as the “cohort
selection problem,” in which a set of exactly n individuals must be selected such that the probabilities of
selection conform to individual fairness constraints [6].
Definition 2.2 (Cohort Selection Problem [6]). Given a universe U of individuals, an integer n, and a task
with metric D , select a cohort C ⊆U of exactly n individuals such that |Pr[u ∈ C]−Pr[v ∈C]| ≤ D(u,v).
We call such a mechanism an individually fair cohort selection mechanism.
Our work extends the investigation into fair composition by considering composition within a pipeline of
cohort selection and scoring steps. We focus on the case of a two-step pipeline, and we assume for simplicity
that the metric for the cohort selection and scoring functions are the same.
Definition 2.3 (Two-stage Cohort pipeline). Given a universe of individuals U , a two-stage cohort pipeline
consists of: a set of permissible cohorts C ⊆ Pow(U)\ /0 (where Pow(U) indicates the power set of U ), a
single (randomized) cohort selection mechanism A which outputs a single cohort C ⊆ C , a set of scoring
functions F : C ×U → [0,1], and a scoring function f ∈ F . The two-stage cohort pipeline procedure is
A◦ f .
We now briefly introduce supporting terminology (summarized in Table 1). For C ∈ C , let A(C) denote
the probability that A outputs C, where the probability is over the randomness in the cohort selection mech-
anism A operating on the universe U . We denote the set of cohorts containing u as Cu, and the probability
that A selects u can be expressed p(u) = ∑C∈Cu A(C). As initial constraints on A and F , we assume that A
is an individually fair cohort selection mechanism and that each f ∈F is individually fair within the cohort
it observes, i.e., it is intra-cohort individually fair:
Definition 2.4 (Intra-cohort individual fairness). Given a cohort C, a scoring function f : C ×U → [0,1] is
intra-cohort individually fair if for all C ∈ C , D(u,v) ≥ | f (C,u)− f (C,v)| for all u,v ∈C.
Although intra-cohort fairness constrains f to be individually fair within a particular cohort, f (C1,u) can
differ arbitrarily from f (C2,u) if C1 6= C2. For ease of exposition we sometimes refer to C as the “cohort
context” or simply the “context” of u for u ∈C.
Remark 2.5 (Intra-cohort individual fairness is insufficient.). A pipeline consisting of an individually fair
cohort selection mechanism and intra-cohort individually fair scoring function may result in arbitrarily unfair
treatment. For example, suppose X = {X1,X2, . . .} is a partition ofU , and A chooses a cohort Xi uniformly
at random. Suppose f assigns score 1 to all members of the cohort corresponding to X∗, and otherwise
assigns score 0. A is not only individually fair, it selects each element with an equal probability; f is not
only intra-cohort individually fair, it treats all members of a given cohort equally; yet the pipeline can result
in arbitrarily large differences in scores for similar individuals. Furthermore, this observation holds for
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any partition including adversarially chosen partitions. Although this abstract example suffices to prove the
point, we include an extensive set of realistic pipeline examples, analogous to the “Catalog of Evils” of [5],
in Appendix A. We also include a practical method for malicious pipeline construction in Appendix C.
An important part of the pipeline definition is the contextual behavior of f , i.e., the behavior of the second
stage of the pipeline may depend on the selected cohortC. The simplistic solution to this problem is to design
and evaluate the whole pipeline for fairness as a single unit, i.e. requiring that similar individuals have similar
distributions over ∆(Opipeline). Although such evaluation would catch unfairness, it (1) doesn’t provide
explicit guidance for designing any given component, (2) may miss certain pipeline-specific fairness issues
(see Examples 2.7 and 2.9), and (3) “locks” the pipeline into a single monolithic strategy, which is highly
impractical. For example, employers frequently need to change compensation policies due to changing
market conditions. However, changing compensation policies due to disliking a particular member of a
cohort, e.g. switching to equal bonuses for all team members if the company does not like the individual
who would have received the largest bonus, is not permitted in our model. Indeed, later stages in the
pipeline may be completely ignorant of the existence of prior stages, e.g. a manager deciding on employee
compensation may be unaware of automated resume screening.
This motivates our design goal of robustness: designing the cohort selection mechanism A which com-
poses well with every function in F , rather than expecting the scoring function to properly analyze and
respond to the choices made in the original cohort selection mechanism design. As a result, the only com-
munication necessary between the steps is the description of F . With this in mind, a deceptively(!) simple
extension of Definition 2.1 gives our fairness desideratum for pipelines.
Definition 2.6 (α-Individual Fairness and Robustness for Pipelines (informal)). Consider the pipeline con-
sisting of (C ,A,F ), with outcome space Opipeline. For f ∈ F , the pipeline instantiated with f satisfies
α−individual fairness with respect to the similarity metric D and a distance measure d : ∆(Opipeline)×
∆(Opipeline)→ [0,1] if ∀u,v ∈U , d([ f ◦A](u), [ f ◦A](v))≤ αD(u,v).
If the pipeline satisfies α−individual fairness with respect to every f ∈F , i.e., if ∀ f ∈F and ∀u,v ∈U ,
d([ f ◦A](u), [ f ◦A](v))≤ αD(u,v), we say that A is α−robust to F with respect to d,D .
We model the contextual nature of the problem by allowing the behavior of each f ∈ F to depend on
the cohort, rather than allowing f to be chosen adaptively in response to the selected cohort. This modeling
choice still allows us to capture the contextual nature of scoring policies, while keeping our abstractions
clean.5
2.2. Fairness of pipelines. Lurking in this informal definition are two subtle choices critical to pipeline
fairness: (1) how should distributions over Opipeline be interpreted, and (2) what distance measure d is
appropriate for measuring differences in distributions over Opipeline. In the remainder of this section, we
consider these two questions and frame the notion of robustness parametrized by the two axes: distribution
and distance measure over distributions.
2.2.1. Choosing the interpretation of the distribution. To account for the fact that individuals not selected by
A never receive a score from f the relevant outcome space is the union of possible scores and “not selected,”
i.e. Opipeline := [0,1]∪{⊥}. Thus conditioning on whether an individual was selected or not changes the
interpretation of the distribution over the outcome space and, more importantly, changes the perception of
fairness.
Example 2.7 (Perception of conditional probability). Suppose Alice (a) and Bob (b) are similar but not
equal job candidates, i.e. D(a,b) ∈ (0,0.1]. Consider an individually fair cohort selection mechanism, A
which either selects a cohort containing one of Alice or Bob or neither and satisfies p(a) = p(b) = p∗.
Consider the fairness constraint on the scoring function f for the unconditional distribution over Opipeline:
|p(a) f (a)− p(b) f (b))| ≤ D(a,b), which simplifies to p∗| f (a)− f (b))| ≤ D(a,b). (Note: as Alice and
5See Appendix A for explicit examples of modeling adaptation to changing market conditions.
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Bob never appeared together in a cohort, there is no intra-cohort fairness condition.) The constraint on the
difference in treatment by f is essentially diluted by a factor of p∗.
Enforcing fairness on the unconditional distribution essentially allows the company to hand out job offers
of the following form: “Congratulations you are being offered a position at Acme Corp., you can expect a
promotion after one year with probability x%.” Alice and Bob may receive offers will equal probability, but
the values of x printed on the offer may be wildly different, and as such they will perceive the value of the
job offer differently.
The choice of conditional or unconditional distribution boils down to what perception of fairness is im-
portant. In the case of bonuses or promotions awarded long after hiring, the conditional perception may be
particularly important. However, on shorter time frames or if the only consequential outcome is the final
score, the unconditional distribution may be more appropriate (e.g. resume screening immediately followed
by interviews).6 We consider two approaches which capture these different perspectives: the unconditional
distribution S
N,A, f
u , treats the ⊥ outcome as a score of 0 and the conditional distribution S
C,A, f
u conditions
on u being selected in the cohort. More formally:
Definition 2.8 (Conditional and unconditional distributions). Let S
A, f
u ∈ ∆(Opipeline) be the distribution over
outcomes arising from the pipeline, i.e. f ◦A. SA, fu places a probability of 1− p(u) on ⊥, and for s ∈ [0,1],
S
A, f
u places a probability of ∑C∈C Pr[ f (C,u) = s]A(C) on s.
• The unconditional distribution SN,A, fu is identical to S
A, f
u with the exception that it treats the ⊥ outcome
as if it had score 0. That is, for 0< s≤ 1, SN,A, fu places a probability of ∑C∈C Pr[ f (C,u) = s]A(C) on s; at
s= 0, SN,A, fu has a probability of 1− p(u)+∑C∈C Pr[ f (C,u) = 0]A(C).
• The conditional distribution S
C,A, f
u has probability
∑C∈C Pr[ f (C,u)=s]A(c)
p(u) for each score s ∈ [0,1], i.e., it is
S
A, f
u conditioned on the positive outcome of A(C).
7
Each of these approaches can be viewed as a method for converting a distribution S
A, f
u over Opipeline to
distributions S
C,A, f
u and S
N,A, f
u over [0,1].
2.2.2. Distance measures over distributions. The natural approach for measuring distances between distri-
butions would be to use expectation: that is, duncond,E(SA, fu ,S
A, f
v ) := |E[S
N,A, f
u ]−E[S
N,A, f
v ]| and
dcond,E(SA, fu ,S
A, f
v ) := |E[S
C,A, f
u ]−E[[S
C,A, f
v ]|. Difference in expectation generally captures the unfairness in
the examples discussed thus far. However, a subtle issue can arise from the certainty of outcomes, which
requires greater insight into the distribution of scores.
Example 2.9 (Certainty of outcomes). Consider two equally qualified job candidates, Charlie and Danielle.
As these two candidates are equally qualified, they should clearly be offered jobs and promotions with equal
probability. Recall the company’s pleasant form letter for job offers from Example 2.7, “Congratulations
you are being offered a position at Acme Corp., you can expect a promotion after one year with probability
x%.” Danielle receives an offer with x = 70% (with probability p∗), but Charlie receives either an offer
with x = 100% (with probability 0.7p∗) or an offer with x = 0% (with probability 0.3p∗). Although both
are offered jobs with equal probability and their expectations of promotion are equal, Charlie’s offers have
certainty of promotion (or no promotion) whereas Danielle’s promotion fate is uncertain.
6Although in this work we consider pipelines with a single relevant metric, the conditional versus unconditional question is critically
important when metrics differ between stages of the pipeline. For example, the metric for selecting qualified members of a team
may be different than the metric for choosing an individual from the team to be promoted to a management role, as the two stages
in the pipeline require different skillsets.
7 This definition is not defined if p(u) = 0, since it does not make sense to consider a “conditional distribution” if u is never selected
to be in the cohort (and thus never receives a score). In defining robustness of a cohort selection mechanism, we should thus restrict
to considering u ∈U where p(u)> 0 (and individual fairness of the cohort selection mechanism on its own would provide fairness
guarantees over the probabilities p(u)). For simplicity, we do not explicitly mention this modification.
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As Example 2.9 illustrates, expected score does not entirely capture problems related to the distribution
of scores rather than the average score. Although total-variation distance is a natural choice for evaluating
such distributional differences, it is too strong for this setting. For example, if Charlie receives a score of 0.7
with probability 1 (over randomness of the entire pipeline), while Danielle receives a score of 0.7− ε with
probability 0.5 and a score of 0.7+ε with probability 0.5, then the total variation distance would be 1, though
these outcomes are intuitively very similar. We therefore introduce the notion of mass-moving distance over
probability measures. Mass-moving distance combines total variation distance with earthmover distance to
reflect that similar individuals should receive similar distributions over close (rather than identical) sets of
scores.
Definition 2.10 (Mass-moving distance). Let γ1 and γ2 be probability mass functions over finite sets Ω1 ⊆
[0,1] and Ω2 ⊆ [0,1], respectively. Let V ⊆ [0,1] be the set of real values v ∈ [0,1] such that there exist
probability mass functions γ˜1 and γ˜2 over [0,1] with finite supports Ω˜1 and Ω˜2, respectively, where:
(1) Nothing moves far and mass is conserved. For i= 1,2, there is a function Zi : [0,1]→ ∆(Ω˜i) such that:
(a) Nothing moves far. For all x ∈ [0,1] and y ∈ Supp(Zi(x)), it holds that |x− y| ≤ 0.5v.
(b) Mass is conserved. For all y ∈ Ω˜i, it holds that γ˜i(y) = ∑x∈Ωi z
x
i (y)γi(x), where z
x
i is the probability
mass function of the distribution Zi(x).
(2) Total variation distance is small. It holds that 0.5v ≥ TV (γ˜1, γ˜2) :=
1
2 ∑w∈Ω˜1∪Ω˜2 |γ˜1(w)− γ˜2(w)|.
Then we let MMD(γ1,γ2) = inf(V ).
A simple way to think about mass-moving distance is to break the definition down into two steps: (1)
transforming the original distributions over scores into distributions over a single shared set of adjusted
scores and (2) moving mass between the distributions over adjusted scores.
Since there is a natural association between probability distributions over [0,1] and probability mass
functions over [0,1], Definition 2.10 also gives a notion of distance between probability distributions.8 In
the example of Charlie and Danielle receiving scores of 0.7 or 0.7± ε described above, the mass-moving
distance is at most 2ε since γ˜1 and γ˜2 can both be taken to be the probability measure that places the full
mass of 1 on 0.7.
Using mass-moving distance, we specify two additional complementary distance measures:
dcond,MMD(S
A, f
u ,S
A, f
v ) :=MMD(S
C,A, f
u ,S
C,A, f
v ) and duncond,MMD(S
A, f
u ,S
A, f
v ) :=MMD(S
N,A, f
u ,S
N,A, f
v ).
2.3. Robustly fair pipelines. Recall our informal notion that a cohort selection mechanism A is robust to
a family of scoring functions F if the composition of A and any f ∈ F is individually fair. We can now
formalize robustness as either conditional or unconditional with respect to either expected score or mass
moving distance over score distributions. By evaluating the properties of each combination of distribution
and distance measure, we can capture a range of subtle fairness desiderata in pipelines.9
Definition 2.11 (Robust pipeline fairness). Given a universe U , a metric D , let A be an individually fair
cohort-selection mechanism and let F be a collection of intra-cohort individually fair scoring functions
C ×U → [0,1]. Choose d ∈ {dcond,E,duncond,E, dcond,MMD ,duncond,MMD}, a distance measure over SA, fu . We
say A is α-robust w.r.t F for d if d(S
A, f
u ,S
A, f
v )≤ αD(u,v) for all u,v ∈U and for all f ∈F .
Throughout the rest of this work, we will examine robustness properties in terms of particular settings of
d. As one might expect, mass moving distance over score distributions is a stronger condition than expected
score, and conditional robustness implies unconditional robustness up to a Lipschitz relaxation.10
8We slightly abuse notation and use MMD(X1,X2) for probability distributions X1 and X2, to denote MMD(γ1,γ2) where γ1 is
the probability mass function associated to X1 and γ2 is the probability mass function associated to X2.
9Note that these choices for d are not the only possible choices, and the framework can be extended to different choices of distri-
bution and distance measure to address other fairness concerns.
10See Propositions E.2 and E.1. Interestingly, we show in Theorem B.6 that for some classes of score functions, guaranteeing
individual fairness w.r.t mass-mover distance fairness is “equivalent” to guaranteeing individual fairness w.r.t expected score.
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3. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS
In this section, we describe conditions on A that will result in our desired robustness properties with
respect to a class of scoring functions F . We first consider the description of F available to A, i.e.
the policy. The simplest method of specifying the policy by describing all f ∈ F prohibits adding f
with similar or identical fairness properties to F at a later point and is highly unrealistic (and poten-
tially intractable). In practice, we expect policies to govern how differently f can treat individuals within
different contexts, rather than enumerating the permitted functions. To that end, we propose policies
in the form of a distance function over (cohort, individual) pairs, δF : (C ×U)× (C ×U) → [0,1].
This distance function specifies the maximum difference in score between two (cohort, individual) pairs
δF ((C1,u),(C2,v)) := sup f∈F | f (C1,u)− f (C2,v)|. δ
F captures the salient fairness behavior of the family
of scoring functions, while being succinct in comparison to maintaining a list of all supported f directly.
In fact, as we will show in Lemma 3.2, a partial description or an overestimate of δF will also suffice. To
illustrate our policy descriptions, consider the following two families:
(1) F1 ignores the cohort context entirely, and treats each u ∈ U the same regardless of the cohort, i.e.
F1 = { f | ∃g :U → [0,1] s.t. f (C,u) = g(u) for all (C,u) ∈ C ×U}.
(2) F2 treats u and v similarly within the same context, but has no constraint on treatment in different con-
texts, i.e. F2 = { f | f ((C\{u})∪{v},v)− f (C,u)| ≤D(u,v) for all u,v ∈U and ∀C ∈ C s.t. u ∈C,v /∈C} .
Recall that intra-cohort individual fairness requires that the scoring functions in both families must treat u
and v similarly if they appear in the same cohort, i.e. D(u,v) ≥ | f (C,u)− f (C,v)|.
For the family F1, we observe that δ
F1((C1,u),(C2,v)) = D(u,v), and, intuitively, the designers of A
will not need to consider the behavior of F in their design of A. On the other hand, for F2, we observe
that δF2((C,u),(C,v)) =D(u,v) for any cohortC, but δF2((C,u),(C′,v)) can be much greater than D(u,v)
for C′ 6= C. For this reason, composition planning for A is non-trivial. As one would expect, δF heavily
influences the strength of conditions on A.
3.1. A’s Task: Designing Mechanisms Compatible with δF . We now describe how to design A to guar-
antee robustness with respect to F , given (possibly overestimates of) the distance function δF over (cohort,
individual) pairs describing F . The conditions on A will roughly consist of making sure that A assigns sim-
ilar individuals to similar distributions over cohort contexts, where similarity of (cohort, individual) pairs is
defined with respect to δF .
Although δF is a succinct description of a policy, it is more intuitive when designing with composition
in mind to translate δF into a set of “mappings” specifying which (cohort, individual) pairs will be treated
similarly by f ∈ F . That is, for each pair u,v ∈U , we can describe δF as a partitioning Pu,v of (Cu×
u)∪ (Cv× v) such that each partition or “cluster” has small diameter with respect δ
F , i.e. within a cluster
δF ((C1,u),(C2,v)) ≤ D(u,v). The collection of partitions over all pairs of individuals then defines the
mapping.
Definition 3.1 (Mapping based on δ ). For each pair of distinct individuals u and v, consider the subset
Pu,v := (Cu×{u})∪ (Cv×{v}) of (cohort, individual) pairs. Consider a partition of Pu,v into clusters
that respects δ , i.e. that satisfies the following condition: if (C1,x),(C2,y) are in the same cluster
11, then
δ ((C1,x),(C2,y))≤D(u,v). Let nu,v (and nv,u) be the number of clusters of the partition. We call a collection
of such partitions for each pair u,v 6=U a mapping of C that respects δ .
Mappings interact well with distance functions δ ′ that overestimate δF , as larger distances between
(cohort, individual) pairs imposes more strict conditions on cluster membership. Lemma 3.2 states that a
mapping that respects δ ′ will also respect δF , although the resulting conditions on the mapping might be
more restrictive.
11Note that x,y ∈ {u,v}. Recall that (C1,u) and (C2,u) may appear in the same cluster, and thus it is possible that x= y.
7
C. Dwork, C. Ilvento and M. Jagadeesan Individual Fairness in Pipelines
Term Definition
δF : (C ×U)×(C ×
U)→ [0,1].
distance function specifying the maximum difference in treatment between (co-
hort,individual) pairs by any f ∈ F . δF ((C1,u),(C2,v)) is undefined if u 6∈ C1 or
v 6∈C2.
Mu,v : Cu → N a mapping of the cohorts containing u to clusters containing (C,u).
nu,v The number of clusters in a mapping
Mδ the set of all mappings which respect δ .
TABLE 2. Policy and mapping terminology
Lemma 3.2. Let δ ′ : (C ×U)× (C ×U)→ [0,1] be a distance function. Suppose that δ ′ has the property
that for all pairs of cohort contexts (C1,x),(C2,y)∈C ×U, it holds that δ
′((C1,x),(C2,y))≥ δ
F ((C1,x),(C2,y)).
If a mapping respects δ ′, then the mapping also respects δF .
Proof. Consider any pair of individuals u and v, and consider any mapping that respects δ ′. In the partition
corresponding to u and v, if (C1,x) and (C2,y) are in the same cluster, then it holds that δ
F ((C1,x),(C2,y))≤
δ ′((C1,x),(C2,y)) ≤D(u,v). Thus, the mapping respects δ
F , as desired. 
We now briefly introduce supporting terminology for policies and mappings (summarized in Table 2). To
succinctly refer to the clusters in a mapping, we define label functionsMu,v :Cu→N andMv,u :Cv→N such
that Mu,v(C) is the label of the cluster containing (C,u) and Mv,u(C) is the label of the cluster containing
(C,v). We use nu,v (or nv,u) to denote the number of clusters in a mapping. We also refer to the set of
functions (Mu,v)u6=v∈U , which entirely specify the partitions, as a mapping. Valid mappings for δ are not
necessarily unique, as there may be more than one way to partition Pu,v into clusters with diameter bounded
by D(u,v). We let Mδ be the set of mappings that respect δ .
Given a mapping of δF (or of an overestimate δ ′), we can now interpret “distributions over cohorts”
induced by A as “distributions over clusters” induced by A. Formally, we convert the distributions over
cohorts into measures over [nu,v] for each pair (u,v)∈U×U . As a result, “similar distributions over cohorts”
will turn out to mean “similar measures over [nu,v].”
Definition 3.3. Let (Mu,v)u6=v∈U be a mapping of C . For u,v ∈U , we define measures q
1
u,v and q
2
u,v over the
sample space [nu,v] as follows:
(1) The unconditional measure over cohorts q1u,v on the sample space [nu,v] for each (u,v) ordered pair is
defined as follows. For i ∈ [nu,v], we let q
1
u,v(i) = ∑C∈Cu|Mu,v(C)=iA(C).
12
(2) The conditional measure over cohorts q2u,v on the sample space [nu,v] for each (u,v) ordered pair is
defined as follows. For i ∈ [nu,v], we let q
2
u,v(i) =
∑C∈Cu |Mu,v(C)=iA(C)
p(u) .
1314
We now specify sufficient conditions for robustness in terms of distances between these measures over
[nu,v]. The conditions require that for each pair u,v ∈U , A assigns similar probabilities to cohorts containing
u and cohorts containing v within each cluster.
Definition 3.4 (α-Notions 1 and 2). Let (Mu,v)u6=v∈U be a mapping of C . For u,v ∈U , let q
1
u,v and q
2
u,v be
defined as in Definition 3.3. We define α-Notions 1 and 2 as follows:
12This is not necessarily a probability measure, since the total sum on the sample space is p(u)≤ 1, but it is finite.
13Observe that this is in fact a probability measure since p(u) = ∑C∈Cu A(C) = ∑
Mu,v
i=1 ∑C∈Cu|Mu,v(C)=iA(C).
14Like in Definition 2.8, this definition is not defined if p(u)= 0, since it does not make sense to consider a “conditional distribution”
if u is never selected to be in the cohort (and thus never receives a score). We should thus restrict to considering u∈U where p(u)> 0
(and individual fairness of the cohort selection mechanism on its own would provide fairness guarantees over the probabilities p(u)).
For simplicity, in this extended abstract, we do not explicitly mention this modification.
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(1) For α ≥ 0.5, we say that A satisfies α-Notion 1 if for all u,v ∈U such that D(u,v)< 1, TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u)≤
(α−0.5)D(u,v). (The 0.5 arising in Notion 1 comes from having to “smooth out” q1u,v to a probability
measure in a later step.)
(2) For α ≥ 0, we say that A satisfies α-Notion 2 if for all u,v ∈U such that D(u,v) < 1, TV (q2u,v,q
2
v,u)≤
αD(u,v).
Our main result is that these conditions guarantee pipeline robustness for composition with any f ∈ F
with respect to mass-moving distance (and thus expected score).15 Theorem 3.5 states that so long as A
satisfies Notion 1 (resp. 2) for the mappings associated with F , then A will be robust with respect to F .
Theorem 3.5 (Robustness to Post-Processing). Let F be a class of scoring functions, let α ≥ 0.5 be a
constant. Suppose that (Mu,v)u6=v∈U is in M 12α δF
. If A is individually fair and satisfies α-Notion 1 (resp.
α-Notion 2) for (Mu,v)u6=v∈U , then A is 2α-robust w.r.t. F for d
uncond,MMD (resp. dcond,MMD).
The proof of Theorem 3.5 appears in Appendix B.1.
Furthermore, these conditions are necessary both for mass-moving distance and the weaker condition of
expected score for certain rich classes of scoring functions.
Theorem 3.6 (Informal). Let d be any metric in
{
duncond,MMD ,dcond,MMD ,dcond,E,duncond,E
}
. Loosely speak-
ing, given F described by mappings such that inter-cluster distances are much larger than intra-cluster
distances, the requirements on A in Theorem 3.5 are necessary for achieving robustness w.r.t. d.
We formalize Theorem 3.6 in Appendix B.16
4. ROBUST MECHANISMS
Although the conditions specified in the previous section are quite strict, and indeed some pathological
scoring function families admit no robust solutions, we can nonetheless construct robust cohort selection
mechanisms for rich classes of scoring policies.17 We exhibit mechanisms robust to two broad classes of
policies:
(1) Individual interchangeability: replacing a single individual in the cohort does not change treatment of
the cohort too much, i.e. policies like δF2 .
(2) Quality-based treatment: cohorts with similar quality “profiles” are treated similarly. That is, the
scoring function only considers the set of qualifications represented within a cohort and is agnostic to
the specific individual(s) exhibiting a given qualification.
These policies cover a wide range of realistic scenarios and allow for significant flexibility and adaptability
in the choice of f . In this section, we demonstrate that these policies also admit a variety of efficient and
expressive constructions for A, i.e. A that may assign a wide range of probabilities p(u) to individuals.
Remark 4.1. As previously noted, robustness is trivial for the class of scoring functions which ignore the
cohort context (F1). We formalize this observation in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2. Consider the mapping that, for each pair of individuals u and v, places all of the cohort
contexts in (Cu×{u})∪ (Cv×{v}) into the same cluster. If A is individually fair, then A satisfies 0.5-Notion
1 and 0.5-Notion 2 w.r.t. this mapping.
4.1. Individual interchangeability. To describe the interchangeability policy, we specify a distance func-
tion δ int : (C ×U)× (C ×U)→ [0,1] that requires that “swapping” any individual in a cohort does not
result in significantly different treatment. More formally:
15See Corollary B.1.1 for a formal statement of the relationship between MMD and expected score.
16See Theorem B.5 and Theorem B.6.
17See Appendix D.1 for an example of F which admits no robust A.
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Definition 4.3 (Individual interchangeability policy).
δ int((C,u),(C′,v)) =


D(u,v) if C =C′
D(u,v) if C′ = (C \{u})∪{v} .
1 otherwise.
δ int can be viewed as an overestimate of δF2 , or as a partial specification of the distance function on a
subset of (C ×U)× (C ×U), trivially completed to 1 on other pairs of cohort context pairs. δ int is naturally
translated into a simple mapping: for any pair of individuals u and v, the partition corresponding to u and v
in the mapping consists of clusters of size 2 consisting of “corresponding” (cohort, individual) pairs. This
follows from observing that if an individual u receives some score f (C,u) in a cohort C, if u were replaced
by v /∈C, then v would receive a score in [ f (C,u)−D(u,v), f (C,u)+D(u,v)]. More formally:
Definition 4.4 (Swapping Mapping). Let C be the set of all subsets of U with exactly k individuals. The
swapping mapping is defined as follows. For each pair of individuals u,v ∈C:
(1) ForC ∈ C such that u,v ∈C, the partition includes the cluster {(C,u),(C,v)}.
(2) ForC ∈ C such that u ∈C and v 6∈C, the partition includes the cluster {(C,u),((C \{u})∪{v} ,v)}.
It is straightforward to verify that the swapping mapping respects δ int.
For the swapping mapping, there is a simple condition under which cohort selection mechanisms satisfy
unconditional robustness (Notion 1): monotonicity.
Definition 4.5 (Monotonic cohort selection). Suppose that C is the set of cohorts of size k. A cohort
selection mechanism A is monotonic if for all pairs of individuals u,v ∈U , for any C′ ⊆U such that |C′|=
k−1 and u,v 6∈C′, if p(u) ≤ p(v) then A(C′∪{u})≤ A(C′∪{v}).
The intuition for the link between the monotonicity property and the swapping mapping is that the prob-
ability masses on a cohort containing u and a cohort containing v that are paired in the swapping mapping
are directionally aligned and cannot diverge by more than D(u,v).
Lemma 4.6. Suppose that C is the set of cohorts of size k. If A is monotonic, then A satisfies 0.5-Notion 1
for the swapping mapping.
Both PermuteThenClassify andWeightedSampling, cohort selection mechanisms proposed in [6], are mono-
tonic, efficient and have a high degree of expressivity.18
However, monotonicity alone is not sufficient to guarantee conditional robustness (Notion 2) for the
swapping mapping (see Appendix C). Borrowing intuition from PermuteThenClassify, we give a novel,
efficient, individually fair cohort selection mechanism that achieves conditional robustness (Notion 2) for
the swapping mapping:
Mechanism 4.7 (Conditioning Mechanism). Given a target cohort size k, a universeU and a distance metric
D , initialize an empty set S. For each individual u ∈U :
(1) Assign a weight w(u) such that |w(u)−w(v)| ≤D(u,v), i.e., the weights are individually fair.
(2) Draw from 1u ∼ Bern(w(u)), (i.e. flip a biased coin with weight w(u)). If 1u, add u to S.
If |S| ≥ k, return a uniformly random subset of S of size k.19 Otherwise, repeat the mechanism.
We show that under mild conditions, the Conditioning Mechanism is satisfies Notion 2, concludes in a small
number of rounds, and allows for a high degree of expressivity. (See Lemma D.5 in Appendix D for a formal
statement and proof details.)
18See Appendix C for detailed descriptions of these mechanisms and formal proofs of the monotonicity property.
19One might imagine a mechanism that conditions on exactly k individuals being chosen, but this mechanism can be arbitrarily far
from individually fair. Consider k−1 individuals with weight 1 and |U |− k−1 individuals with weight 0.9. Conditioning exactly
k individuals would cause |p(u)− p(v)| to diverge arbitrarily for w(u) = .9 and w(v) = 1.
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4.2. Quality-based treatment. One downside of the monotonic mechanisms proposed for δ int is that they
require that any cohort with a single individual swapped is considered with nearly the same probability as
the original cohort. In practice, this is problematic when A needs to ensure that each cohort has a certain
structure. For example, when hiring a team of software engineers, designers and product managers, the pro-
portion of each type of team member is important, and arbitrary swaps are not desirable from the perspective
of team structure. By restricting to scoring functions that only consider the quality profile of a cohort, i.e.
how many individuals from each quality group are represented in a cohort, A can construct highly structured
cohorts, so long as the structure of the cohort is valid with respect to the fairness metric D .
We now consider robust mechanisms for policies predicated on additional structure within the metric over
U . In particular, we assume the existence of a partition of the universe U into one or more “quality groups”
q1, . . . ,qn. These quality groups satisfy the property that the distances within a quality group are smaller
than distances between quality groups. How much smaller is determined by a parameter β . More formally,
Definition 4.8. Let β ≤ 1 be a constant and n≥ 1 be an integer. Consider a partitioning of aU into subsets
q1, . . . ,qn, i.e. “quality groups”, and let D
∗ be a metric on U . Now, we define metrics D on {1, . . . ,n} and
D i for 1≤ i≤ n on qi as follows: we let D(i, j) = infu∈qi,v∈q j D
∗(u,v) and D i be the restriction of D∗ to qi.
We call the metric D∗ endowed with quality groups q1, . . . ,qn β -quality-clustered if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
have that
max
u,v∈qi
D
i(u,v) ≤ β min
j 6=i
D(i, j).
Notice that any metric D∗ is trivially 1-clustered with respect to the trivial quality group q1 =U . The benefit
of endowing D∗ with a greater number of quality groups is to exploit additional structure of the metric, when
any exists.
For simplicity in the specification of the relevant policy and family of scoring functions we introduce a
quality profile function P to count the number of individuals in each quality group in a cohort: that is,
P : 2U →
{
(x1, . . . ,xn) | xi ∈ Z
≥0
}
, and the ith coordinate of P(C) is |C∩qi|. Loosely speaking, the quality-
based treatment policy requires that the only information about a cohort utilized by the scoring functions is
its quality profile. We now formally define F3 and an associated policy δ
quality :
Definition 4.9. Let β ≤ 1 be a constant. Suppose that D is endowed with quality groups q1, . . . ,qn and D is
β -quality-clustered. We define F3 to be the set of intra-cohort individually fair score functions f : C ×U →
[0,1] satisfying the following conditions:
(1) ForC,C′ ∈ C satisfying P(C) = P(C′), if u and v that are in the same quality group, then f (C,u) =
f (C′,v).
(2) For integers 1≤ i 6= j≤ n,C,C′ ∈C satisfying P(C) = P(C′), and any individuals u∈ q j and v∈ q j,
it holds that | f (C,u)− f (C′,v)| ≤D(i, j).
When each quality group is homogeneous in terms of individual “quality”, this corresponds to score func-
tions that are determined purely by “quality”.20 As in Section 4.1, we specify a distance function δ quality :
(C ×U)× (C ×U)→ [0,1] that overestimates δF3 , but still preserves enough of the fairness structure to
construct the desired mapping.
Definition 4.10 (Quality-based treatment policy). Given a universe U , a set of permissible cohorts C and
distance metrics and quality groups as in Definition 4.9,
(1) ForC,C′ ∈ C satisfying P(C) = P(C′), if u ∈ q j and v ∈ q j, then δ
quality((C,u),(C′,v)) = 0.
(2) For integers 1≤ i 6= j≤ n,C,C′ ∈ C satisfying P(C) = P(C′), and any individuals u ∈ q j and v ∈ q j, we
set δ quality((C,u),(C′,v)) = D(i, j).
The core intuition is that a nice mapping exists when C is “symmetric with respect to individuals in each
quality group.” It is helpful here to consider a bipartite graph G= (A,B,E), where A has one vertex for each
20In this case, F3 includes Equal Treatment, Promotion, Stack Rank, and Fixed Bonus (discussed in Appendix A) when scores are
based on the “quality” of “performance” of individuals.
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subset of the universe U , B has one vertex for each possible profile of a subset of U , and there is an edge
(a,b) ∈ E precisely when b is the profile of a, that is b= P(a).
Fix any C , and consider the subgraph G′ = (A′,B′,E ′) of G induced by the vertices in A corresponding
to members of C , the edges incident on these vertices, and the subset of B induced by these edges. We say
that C is quality-symmetric if for all b′ ∈ B′ it is the case that E ′ contains all the edges in E (in the original
graph) incident on b′.
That is, C contains all cohorts obtained by swapping out individuals from the same quality group. If C
is quality-symmetric, then consider the following mapping.
Definition 4.11 (Quality-Based Mapping). Let β ≤ 1 be a constant. Suppose that D is endowed with
quality groups q1, . . . ,qn and D is β -quality-clustered. Suppose C is quality-symmetric. The quality-
based mapping is defined as follows. For each pair of individuals u,v ∈ C, let Pu,v = (Cu × {u})∪
(Cv ×{v}). For each (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ P(Cu ∪Cv), the partitioning of Pu,v contains a cluster of the form
{(C,x) ∈Pu,v | P(C) = (x1, . . . ,xn)}.
We verify that the quality-based mapping indeed respects δ quality (and thus respects δF3 by Lemma 3.2). If
u and v are in the same quality group, then the diameter of each cluster under δ quality is 0, which is trivially
upper bounded by D(u,v). On the other hand, if u and v are in different quality groups qi and q j respectively,
then the diameter of each cluster is no more than D(i, j) ≤ D(u,v). Thus, the properties of a mapping are
satisfied by the quality-based mapping.
In this scenario, the quality-based mapping captures the intuition for the fairness structure of F3 much
better than δ quality. The mapping groups together all cohorts with the same quality profile (i.e. the same
number of individuals in each quality group), capturing the intuition that the only information that a score
function in F3 utilizes about a cohort is the quality profile.
As the score function behavior does not depend on the specific individuals in a quality group, A should
have significant freedom to choose individuals within each quality group while still satisfying robustness
w.r.t. F3. We will show that once the number of members of each quality group in the cohort is decided,
utilizing any individually fair cohort selection mechanism within each quality group will satisfy our condi-
tions. Moreover, our mechanisms have some flexibility in deciding the quality profile as well.
Mechanism 4.12 (Quality Compositional Mechanisms). Let β ≤ 1 be a constant, and suppose that D en-
dowed with quality groups q1, . . . ,qn is β -quality-clustered. Suppose also that C is quality-symmetric. For
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and each 1 ≤ xi ≤ |qi|, let Ai,xi be a D
i-individually fair mechanism selecting xi individuals
in qi. We define the quality compositional mechanism for {Ai,xi} as follows. Let X be any distribution
over n-tuples of nonnegative integers (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ P(C ).
(1) Draw (x1, . . . ,xn)∼X .
(2) Independently run Ai,xi for each 1≤ i≤ n, and return the union of the outputs of all of these mecha-
nisms.
In the next lemma, we show that when a quality composition mechanism only selects cohorts whose qual-
ity projection vectors (x1, . . . ,xn) are “close” to an inter-quality group distance multiple of (|q1|, . . . , |qn|),
Notion 1 is achieved. (This requirement essentially says that the relative proportion of selected individuals
in each quality group needs to be approximately reflective of the relative proportion of individuals in each
quality group in the universe, scaled by the difference between the quality groups in the original metric. This
type of requirement turns out be necessary for basic individual fairness guarantees, by the constrained cohort
impossibility result in [6].) Moreover, under stronger conditions, we show that Notion 2 is also achieved.
Lemma 4.13. Let β ≤ 0.5 be a constant, and suppose that D endowed with quality groups q1, . . . ,qn
is β -quality-clustered. Suppose also that C is quality-symmetric, and let X be any distribution over
(x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ P(C ) such that |
xi
|qi|
−
x j
|q j |
| ≤ (1− 2β )D(i, j). If A is a quality compositional mechanism,
then:
(1) A is always individually fair.
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(2) A always satisfies 0.5-Notion 1.
(3) A satisfies 0.5-Notion 2 for D and δF if either of the following conditions hold:
(a) (One set) |Supp(X )|= 1 (i.e. one “canonical” (x1, . . . ,xn)), or
(b) (0-1 metric) D(i, j) = 1 for 1≤ i 6= j ≤ n and D i(u,v) = 0 for 1≤ i≤ n.
The quality compositional mechanisms provide a greater degree of structure in cohort selection than the
monotone mechanisms giving in Section 4.1. The Conditioning Mechanism and similar monotone mecha-
nisms are forced to select individuals essentially independently, with the only dependence stemming from
the cohort size constraint. However, structured cohorts are necessary in a number of practical applications,
as previously noted. Although δ quality imposes more constraints on the permitted F than δ int, the basis for
these constraints is likely to be tolerated well in legitimate use cases in which structure is important.
Moreover, the company has flexibility in selecting individuals within each experience group, as any indi-
vidually fair mechanism can be utilized. This offers significantly more flexibility than selecting members in
each quality group uniformly at random. Such flexibility is particularly crucial, for example, if a company
further wants to ensure that tech company teams have a mixture of software engineers and product man-
agers. The individually fair mechanisms within each quality group can help achieve this balance through
selecting balanced subsets of engineers and product managers. In essence, the quality compositional mech-
anisms allow flexibility in cohort selection while still satisfying robustness for F3, due to restrictions on the
behavior of scoring functions in F3.
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a framework for evaluating the robustness of cohort selection as part of a pipeline.
We’ve demonstrated that naive auditing strategies concerning average cohort quality or score are unable to
uncover significant fairness problems. We’ve also shown that many reasonable policies for cohort selection
and subsequent scoring can conflict with each other resulting in very poor fairness outcomes. Furthermore,
we’ve demonstrated that a malicious pipeline designer can easily use composition problems to disguise bad
behavior. Despite these hurdles, we’ve shown that it is possible to construct pipelines that are fair. In partic-
ular we’ve shown that constructing cohort selection mechanisms that are robust to composition with a family
of scoring functions is possible. By framing the problem in terms of robustness, we address the concern that
placing requirements on future designs is nearly unenforceable, whereas designing the current stage to be
robust to a large class of potential future policies can give much better practical guarantees. Finally, we’ve
shown robust cohort selection mechanisms that compose well with reasonable scoring function families.
In the process of exploring robustness and fairness in pipelines, we uncovered a number of interesting
questions for future work. Policy complexity: we have considered a set of concise and practical policies
in this work, but the trade-off between policy complexity and the expressiveness of cohort selection has not
been fully characterized. Fair Matching: choosing a cohort is very similar to the problem of assigning
an individual to an existing cohort. However, in the traditional matching literature, significant emphasis
is placed on individuals’ and teams’ preferences over placements, rather than external fairness criteria. Is
it possible to simultaneously achieve a good matching, in the sense of satisfying preferences or stability,
and individual fairness? Quantifying the tradeoff: There are significant differences in the difficulty for
constructing mechanisms which satisfy the conditional, versus unconditional, notion of robustness. Is it
possible to more directly quantify the tradeoff in mechanism expressivity between these two settings? Dif-
ferent metrics: Handling different metrics in the pipeline: we considered just one metric throughout the
entire pipeline, but using different metrics for different stages of the pipeline may be valid. For example, in
the case of promoting an individual contributor to a management position, the metric for “manager” may be
different. Ranking instead of scoring: although ranking with hard cutoffs does not satisfy individual fair-
ness, it is frequently used in practice. Can the model we have outlined with respect to scoring be translated
to ranking, e.g., incorporating the results of [7]?
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6. RELATED WORK
There is a wide variety of work concerning fairness in machine learning [9, 14, 25, 17, 3, 18, 26, 22,
10, 16, 15, 11, 12, 20, 19, 4, 24, 5]. Individual fairness was introduced by Dwork et al. [5]. Dwork and
Ilvento studied composition of combination of individually fair and group fair classifiers [6]. Two other
recent lines of work have also considered composition problems and fair systems. First, several works have
studied the problem of feedback loops, in which decisions that previous time steps, such as where to send
law enforcement officers, influence outcomes at later time steps potentially unrelated to the original decision
[12, 8, 21]. Bower et al. study fairness in a pipeline of decisions under a group-based notion of fairness [1].
They primarily consider the combination of multiple non-adaptive sequential decisions, evaluating fairness
at the end of the pipeline. Second, several works have considered competitive scenarios, such as advertising,
in which many (potentially fair or unfair) classifiers compete for individuals [2, 13]. Although not explicitly
addressing composition, recent work considering fairness in rankings, e.g. [7], also address fairness in a
setting in which outcomes, in this case rankings, naturally depend on the outcomes of others.
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APPENDIX A. EXTENDED MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
To complement the motivating examples included throughout the text, we include a “Catalog of Evils”
relevant to pipelines.
In each example, we consider a universeU comprised of individuals belonging to two groups, a majority
group S and a minority group T , such that the majority group is k times as large as the minority group (i.e.
k|T |= |S|). For the particular employment task in question, there is a known metric D which specifies who
is similar to whom for the purposes of this task. For simplicity, we assume that D is one-dimensional, i.e.
each individual u has a qualification qu ∈ [0,1], and D(u,v) := |qu− qv|. We assume that S and T have
an equal distribution of talents: more specifically, for every qualification level q, there are exactly k times
as many individuals with qualification q in S as there are in T . We assume that there is a nontrivial range
of qualifications in [0,1], and we will generally assume that the company prefers to hire the most highly
qualified candidates, but in order to fill the number of positions open cannot hire only maximally qualified
candidates. We use QH to refer to the subset of individuals who are highly qualified.
Our examples are based on a set of facially neutral company compensation policies. We now give precise
descriptions of these policies in the form of a scoring function, and indicate where the scoring policies must
be adjusted to give intra-cohort individual fairness. (As we will see later, even adjusting the policies to be
intra-cohort individually fair won’t be enough to prevent bad behavior under composition.)
(1) Fixed Bonus Pool: A fixed pool of bonus money B is assigned to each team and is split between the
members of each team, with the highest achieving members receiving larger portions of the pool. More
formally, given a cohort of individuals C = {x1, . . . ,xc} of size c with qualifications {qx1 , . . . ,qxc}, the
scoring function fB assigns a bonus share bi to each individual xi such that ∑u∈C bu = 1, optimized to
ensure that individuals with higher qualification receive larger bonuses.
In particular, fB can either be a simple proportional mechanism, e.g. fB(u)∝ qu, or it can be optimized
for specific goals, e.g. maximizing the difference in compensation between the most and least qualified
individuals, creating an even spread of compensations, etc. For example, the company could choose fB
using the following optimization to choose the largest “weighted spread” to maximize the objective of
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increasing the difference in compensation based on difference in qualification:
argmax{bu∈[0,1]}{ ∑
u,v∈C
(bu−bv)(qu−qv)}
subject to
|bu−bv| ≤ |qu−qv| for all u,v ∈C
∑
u∈C
bu = 1
This optimization will tend to choose bonus shares that maximize the differences in bonuses between
individuals with significantly different qualifications within the cohort. Notice that the scoring function
has no way of knowing what other cohorts may or may not appear and with what probabilities, and so it
only optimizes within the particular cohort C.
(2) Stack Rank: The bottom 10% of each team may be fired or put on “performance plans”. Formally,
f (C,u) :=
{
1 if
|{v|qu>qv}|
|C| ≤ 0.1,
0 otherwise
However, this strict cut off violates intra-cohort individual fairness, as two nearly equally qualified
individuals might find themselves on opposite sides of the cutoff. Alternatively, we can construct a
scoring function which closely approximates the desired policy but still satisfies intra-cohort individual
fairness, by optimizing subject to the intra-cohort fairness constraints. For example, taking Ou to be
the indicator that u is in the bottom 10% of the cohort, one could use the following optimization to
maximize the probability that only the bottom 10% are placed on performance plans
argmax f ∑
u∈C
f (C,u)Ou+(1− f (C,u))(1−Ou)
subject to
| f (C,u)− f (C,v)| ≤ |qu−qv| for all u,v ∈C
Alternatively, if exactly 10% of the cohort should be put on performance plans, Permute-Then-Classify
can be applied or an additional constraint on the expected number of employees placed on performance
plans could be added to the optimization above in order to satisfy intra-cohort individual fairness.
(3) Equal Treatment: Each team’s bonus is determined by average performance of the team (assumed to be
proportional to average quality) and awarded equally to each member. Formally, the scoring function f
first chooses the total bonus amount BC ∝ B∑u∈C qu, and then assigns bu =
BC
|C| for all u ∈C. Intra-cohort
individual fairness for f is trivial, as every individual is treated equally.
(4) Promotion: Choose the single most qualified person on the team to promote, based on performance.
As in the case of stack ranking, strictly implementing this policy will violate intra-cohort individual
fairness, as nearly equal individuals may be treated very differently. As above we can satisfy intra-
cohort individual fairness by posing the relevant optimization question, and Permute-then-Classify (see
Appendix C) can be used to select exactly one individual for promotion.
We now show that these compensation policies can cause significant unfairness for T when combined
with simple hiring protocols. In each case, we state the set of cohorts the company intends to select from,
and we assume that the company uses a method similar to the one described in Appendix C.3 to derive a fair
set of weights to use to sample a single cohort in an individually fair way.21 First, we consider the “packing”
hiring protocol.
21We omit the details of the method and the particulars of the conditions on the set of cohorts specified as they are easy to fulfill in
these settings. In particular, each set of cohorts we specify can clearly be used to form a partition ofU , fulfilling the requirements
of Theorem C.7.
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Example A.1 (Packing). Suppose that in the past, the company had a particular problem retaining em-
ployees from the minority group T and in order to address this problem, the company ensures that indi-
viduals with high potential from T are always hired together into the same team for mutual support. On
the other hand, talented members of S are spread out between the other teams, to make sure that there is
at least one highly talented individual on each team. Formally, the company specifies the set of cohorts
Cpacking = {C ∈ C | (|C∩T ∩QH |> 1∧|C∩S∩QH |= 0)⊕ (|C∩T ∩QH |= 0∧|C∩S∩QH |= 1)}, where
QH is the set of highly qualified candidates, and samples a single cohort from the set such that individual
fairness is satisfied.
“Packing” results in lower compensation for T for Fixed Bonus Pool, Stack Rank, and Promotion com-
pensation policies. “Packing” causes talented members of T to be on teams of higher average quality than
those with talented members of S. As a result, members of T will receive lower bonuses and promoted less
often than members of S. Thus, this seemingly beneficial practice can backfire when composed with certain
compensation policies.
One may imagine that utilizing a “splitting” strategy, where qualified members of T are separated from
other qualified members to increase their chance of “standing out” on teams, would solve this issue.
Example A.2 (Splitting). The company chooses teams where highly qualified members of T are always the
only highly qualified member of their team, giving them the opportunity to stand out and be recognized for
their talent. More formally, the company chooses from the set of cohorts Csplitting = {C ∈C | (|C∩T ∩QH |=
1∧|C∩S∩QH|= 0)⊕ (|C∩T ∩QH |= 0∧|C∩S∩QH| ≥ 1)}. In each cohort containing a highly qualified
member of T , there are no other highly qualified individuals (from either T or S).
Though this policy no longer leads to lower compensation for T for Stack Rank, Fixed Bonus Pool, and
Promotion, “Splitting” results in lower compensation for T for Equal Treatment, because the practice causes
talented members of T to be on teams of lower average quality than talented members of S. As a result, with
Equal Treatment, qualified S will receive greater compensation than qualified T . Splitting can also occur
when members of T are primarily hired via outreach. For example, suppose that a company has been trying
to form a team to work on a difficult or low prestige task (e.g. Fortran code maintenance). All of the talented
candidates in S pass on the job offer because they are confident they can do better, so HR reaches out more
aggressively to candidates in T . These candidates may be more willing to take the job because they are
less confident about their other options. Thus, even without an explicit policy in place to choose minority
candidates to be the singular most qualified member on a less qualified team, these situations can still arise
from the interactions between the hiring procedure and the job market.
Remark A.3. The motivation for both of these policies could be malicious, and determining whether the
stated goals or justifications were legitimate aims of the policy would be difficult.
One may imagine that these issues could be addressed by ensuring that qualified members of T and
qualified members of S appearing on teams with similar average quality. However, a malicious company
can still cause members of T to receive lower compensation.
Example A.4 (Adversarial ranking). Suppose that the company did not want any member of the T to be
chosen for promotion or wished to depress their compensation relative to the members of S. The company
decides to choose teams such that, for each team, there is a correspondence between the members of T and
S included in the team, such that the members of S are almost always more talented than their counterparts
in T . (Given the equal distribution of talents of T and S, there may be an excess member of T that is
allowed to be the most qualified, but this is a singular case.) More formally, the company chooses from
Cadv.ranking = {C ∈ C | ∃G :C∩T →C∩S s.t. ∀u ∈C∩T , qu < qG(u)}.
“Adversarial Ranking” is particularly catastrophic for T for Promotion or Stack Ranking if the hard cutoff
(not intra-cohort individually fair) versions are used. Although ensuring intra-cohort individual fairness
helps, members of T will always be seeing depressed levels of promotion, higher levels of firing, and lower
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levels of compensation except in the case of Equal Treatment. Thus “Adversarial Ranking” keenly illustrates
that average team quality is not sufficient to ensure that individuals are truly being treated fairly in cohort-
based pipelines. We stress that Adversarial Ranking can also be efficiently achieved using the procedure in
Theorem C.7.
A.1. Sample Cohorts. To illustrate these issues, we include Figures 1a and 1b to compare the example
scoring functions for a pair of cohorts, demonstrating the issues outlined above.
Quali-
fication
Fixed
Pool
Bonus
Equal
Bonus
Cohort 1
Alice 0.8 35 60
Bob 0.7 25 60
Charlie 0.5 5 60
Dan 0.2 0 60
Eve 0.8 35 60
Cohort 2
Frank 0.8 57 40
George 0.6 36 40
Harriet 0.1 0 40
Ivan 0.2 0 40
Julia 0.3 7 40
(A) Bonus score function comparisons for
two cohorts, each containing five individu-
als of varying qualifications. Cohort 1 has
an average qualification of 0.6, and Cohort
2 has an average qualification of 0.4. In
the fixed pool bonus, a total pool of 100
is split between the members of the co-
horts. The same optimization is used for
both cohorts, that is according the maxi-
mum possible bonus to the most qualified
individual(s). Notice that in Cohort 1, Al-
ice and Eve have to share the top bonus (35
each), but in Cohort 2, Frank doesn’t have
to split the top bonus (57). Notice also that
George and Julia receive higher bonuses
than Bob and Charlie, even though they are
(much) less qualified. On the other hand,
in the equal bonus setting Frank receives a
lower bonus than both Alice and Eve, even
though he’s equally qualified.
Quali-
fication
Pro-
motion
Stack
Rank
(IF)
Stack
Rank
(ex-
act,
not
IF)
Cohort 1
Alice 0.8 35% 0 0
Bob 0.7 25% 10% 0
Charlie 0.5 5% 30% 0
Dan 0.2 0 60% 1
Eve 0.8 35% 0 0
Cohort 2
Frank 0.8 57% 0 0
George 0.6 36% 0 0
Harriet 0.1 0 43% 1
Ivan 0.2 0 33% 0
Julia 0.3 7% 24% 0
(B) Promotion score function comparison of the
cohorts from Figure 1a. The promotion policy at-
tempts to maximize the probability of promotion
for the most qualified individuals, subject to the in-
dividual fairness constraints and that the expected
number of promotions is 1. In this case, essen-
tially the same observations apply as in the fixed
pool bonus setting. In the case of Stack rank, both
cohorts are optimized to maximize the probabil-
ity of placing the least qualified person on a per-
formance plan. Notice that Dan is much more
likely to be placed on a performance plan than the
equally qualified Ivan, due to the larger number of
less qualified individuals in Cohort 2. Although it
might seem that the exact stack rank policy, rather
than the individually fair version, would be less
likely to have this problem, in fact in this case Dan
is still treated differently than Ivan.
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APPENDIX B. EXTENDED DETAILS ON CONDITIONS
In this section, we provide proofs and some additional results mentioned in Section 3. In proving results,
we consider the mass-moving distance between probability distributions over scores. That is, for every pair
of individuals u and v and every score function f ∈ F , we consider the mass-moving distance between
S
N,A, f
u and S
N,A, f
u (resp. S
C,A, f
u and S
C,A, f
v ).
A simple way to think about our notion of mass-moving distance is to break the definition down into two
steps: (1) transforming the original distributions over scores into distributions over a single shared set of
adjusted scores and (2) moving mass between the distributions over adjusted scores. By introducing the
transformation in step (1), we take the two distributions over scores (which may have disjoint supports) and
transform them into distributions over a single support of adjusted scores so that similar scores are mapped
to similar adjusted scores.
The next consideration is how we can choose adjusted scores and write distributions over adjusted scores
in a way that takes advantage of what we know about the mapping and similar treatment of similar cohort
contexts by f . To do this, we write the distributions over adjusted scores (S˜
N,A, f
u and S˜
N,A, f
v (resp. S˜
C,A, f
u and
S˜
C,A, f
v )) in terms of the distributions over clusters induced by A (q
1
u,v (resp. q
2
u,v)).
Why does this help? Given a cluster, we can propose an adjusted score based on its extreme behavior
under f , i.e. the highest and lowest possible scores in the cluster. More formally, given a mapping, we
define a function Q : {1, . . . ,nu,v} → [0,1] to transform the cluster labels that form the sample space of q
1
u,v
(resp. q2u,v) into adjusted scores in [0,1] that form the sample space of S˜
N,A, f
u (resp. S˜
C,A, f
u ). Q will map
each cluster in the partition corresponding to u and v to an adjusted score given by an “average” score in the
cluster. Let S(i) =
{
(C,u) |C ∈M−1u,v (i)
}
∪
{
(C,v) |C ∈M−1v,u (i)
}
be the (cohort, individual) pairs appearing
in the cluster i. Let ai and bi be the minimum and maximum scores in { f (C,x) | (C,x) ∈ S(i)}. Now, we let
Q(i) = ai+bi
2
, which can be viewed as an “average” score in the cluster. Briefly, this choice of definition for
Q will guarantee that intra-cluster differences in treatment are bounded by D(u,v), and thus mapping scores
within a cluster to this “average” will conform to the requirement that the transformation to adjusted scores
doesn’t move any score “too far.” (See Definition 2.10.1.)
We can now write the distributions S˜
C,A, f
u and S˜
N,A, f
u in terms of clusters. For each j ∈ [0,1], notice that
Q−1( j) gives the set of clusters which correspond to that score (if such a cluster exists). q∗u,v(Q
−1( j)) then
yields the probability assigned to each cluster corresponding to the score j by A. More formally, we define
S˜
C,A, f
u ( j) as follows:
S˜C,A, fu ( j) =
{
q2u,v(Q
−1( j)) if j ∈ Q([nu,v])
0 if j 6∈ Q([nu,v]).
We define S˜
N,A, f
u ( j) similarly, with the slight modification that we place an additional 1− p(u) mass at 0 to
account for the fact that not being selected in a cohort corresponds to a score of 0.
S˜N,A, fu ( j) =


q1u,v(Q
−1( j)) if j ∈ Q([nu,v]), if j 6= 0
q1u,v(Q
−1(0))+1− p(u) if j = 0
0 otherwise.
We analogously define these quantities for v.
B.1. Proofs for Section 3. Using the distributions over adjusted scores, we can now prove Theorem 3.5.
Theorem B.1 (Restatement of Theorem 3.5). Let F be a class of scoring functions, let α ≥ 0.5 be a
constant. Suppose that (Mu,v)u6=v∈U is in M 12α δF
. If A is individually fair and satisfies α-Notion 1 (resp.
α-Notion 2) for (Mu,v)u6=v∈U , then we have that A is 2α-robust w.r.t. F for d
uncond,MMD (resp. dcond,MMD).
Proof of Theorem B.1. Pick a pair of individuals u 6= v ∈U . Pick any α ≥ 0.5. Assuming that A satisfies α-
Notion 1 (i.e. Definition 3.4.1), we construct measures in the mass-moving definition that achieve a distance
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of no more than αD(u,v). We use S˜N,A, fu and S˜
N,A, f
v (resp. S˜
C,A, f
u and S˜
C,A, f
v ) as defined above as our finite
support measures in the mass-moving distance definition.
The proof consists of three steps: First, we take as given that S˜
N,A, f
u and S˜
N,A, f
v (resp. S˜
C,A, f
u and S˜
C,A, f
v )
satisfy Definition 2.10.1 (i.e., that there exists some Z satisfying the first condition) and we show that 2.10.2
is satisfied. This follows from a straightforward computation of total variation distance. Next, we exhibit
the appropriate Z for 2.10.1 by linking the adjusted scores given by Q(i) to the original scores and showing:
(A) no score moves too far when adjusted and (B) mass is conserved. Both arguments follow from the
construction of the function Z.
First, we consider Condition 2.10.2 (i.e. “total variation distance is small”) for the distributions over
adjusted scores. We use the fact that
TV (S˜C,A, fu , S˜
C,A, f
v )= ∑
j∈Supp(S˜
C,A, f
u )
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i∈Q−1( j)
(q2u,v(i)−q
2
v,u(i))
∣∣∣∣∣≤
nu,v
∑
i=1
|q2u,v(i)−q
2
v,u(i)|= TV (q
2
u,v,q
2
v,u)≤αD(u,v),
where the last step follows from α-Notion 2. A similar argument shows that:
TV (S˜N,A, fu , S˜
N,A, f
v )≤ TV (q
1
u,v,q
1
u,v))+0.5|(1− p(u))− (1− p(v))| ≤ αD(u,v),
where the last step follows from α-Notion 1 and individual fairness of A.
Now, we show Condition 2.10.1 (i.e. “nothing moves far and mass is conserved”) for the conversion
of distributions over scores to distributions over adjusted scores. We handle the unconditional case (and a
very similar argument works for the conditional case). We show condition 1 for S˜
C,A, f
u , since an analogous
argument shows condition 1 for S˜
C,A, f
v . We use the following approach to move from the distribution over
scores S
C,A, f
u to the distribution over adjusted scores S˜
C,A, f
u . First, we couple the distributions over scores
and over adjusted scores into a carefully chosen joint distribution Xu ∈ ∆([0,1]×Supp(S˜
N,A, f
u )), where the
x-coordinate can be thought of as the score and y-coordinate can be thought of as the adjusted score. Then,
we implicitly specify the function Z : [0,1]→ ∆(Supp(S˜C,A, fu )) using the joint distribution Xu.
We define Xu as follows. We link the x-coordinate (score) and y-coordinate (adjusted score) through
cohorts: that is, for each cohort C, we place probability of A(C) on the (score, adjusted score) ordered pair
given by ( f (C,u),Q(Mu,v(C))). More formally, for x ∈ [0,1] and y ∈ Supp(S˜
C,A, f
u )) such that (x,y) 6= (0,0),
we define:
Xu((x,y)) =


∑C∈Cu, f (C,u)=x,Q(Mu,v(C))=yA(C) if (x,y) 6= (0,0)
1− p(u)+∑C∈Cu, f (C,u)=0,Q(Mu,v(C))=0A(C) if (x,y) = (0,0)
0 otherwise.
It is straightforward to observe that the marginal distribution of the x-coordinates of Xu is S
C,A, f
u , and the
marginal distribution of the y-coordinates of Xu is S˜
C,A, f
u .
Now, we are ready to define the function Z : [0,1] → ∆(Supp(S˜C,A, fu )). For each x ∈ [0,1], we define
Z(x), which is a probability measure on Supp(S˜C,A, fu ), as follows. First, we define the distribution X xu ∈
∆({x}×Supp(S˜N,A, fu )) to beXu conditioned on the x-coordinate being x. Then, Z(x) is given by the marginal
distribution of the y-coordinates of X xu .
First, we show that the first sub-condition (i.e. that “nothing moves far”) is satisfied. It suffices to
show that for all C ∈ C , it holds that | f (C,u)−Q(Mu,v(C))| ≤ αD(u,v). Suppose that (C,u) is in cluster
i. We know that 1
2α | f (C,u)−Q(Mu,v(C))| ≤
1
2α 0.5(bi − ai) ≤ 0.5D(u,v), since scores in cluster i have
small diameter by the conditions required for a mapping respecting 1
2α δ
F . This means that | f (C,u)−
Q(Mu,v(C))| ≤ (0.5)(2α)D(u,v),
Now, we show that the second sub-condition on Supp(S˜C,A, fu ) (i.e. that “mass is conserved”) is satisfied.
Let γ be the probability mass function associated withXu. Moreover, for each x∈ [0,1], Z(x) is a probability
distribution over Supp(S˜
C,A, f
u ), and we let zx be its probability mass function. For each y∗ ∈ Supp(S˜
C,A, f
u ),
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we wish to show that:
S˜C,A, fu (y
∗) = ∑
x∈Supp(SC,A, fu )
zx(y∗)SC,A, fu (x).
Using the fact that the marginal distribution of Xu on the x-coordinates is S
C,A, f
u , along with the fact that
Z(x) is the distribution on the y-coordinates conditional on the x-coordinate being x, we can deduce that
S
C,A, f
u (x)zx(y∗) = γ((x,y∗)). Thus, we have that
∑
x∈SuppSC,A, fu
zx(y∗)SC,A, fu (x) = ∑
(x,y∗)∈SuppXu
γ((x,y∗)).
This is the probability mass at y∗ of the marginal distribution of the y-coordinates of Xu. Using that the
marginal distribution of the y-coordinates ofXu is S˜
C,A, f
u , we know that ∑(x,y∗)∈SuppXu γ
′((x,y∗)) = S˜C,A, fu (y∗)
as desired. 
B.2. Additional results. First, we state a corollary of Theorem 3.5 that gives conditions for robustness w.r.t
expected score, using the fact that the weaker notion of expected score robustness follows from the stronger
notion of mass-moving distance robustness.
Corollary B.1.1 (Robustness to Post-Processing w.r.t Expected Score). Let F be a class of scoring func-
tions, and let α ≥ 0.5 be a constant. Suppose that (Mu,v)u6=v∈U is in M 1α δF
. If A satisfies α-Notion 1 (resp.
α-Notion 2) for (Mu,v)u6=v∈U , then we have that A is 6α-robust w.r.t. F for d
uncond,E (resp. dcond,E).
Proof of Corollary B.1.1. This is implied by Theorem 3.5 and the using the relationship between mass-
moving distance and expected score in Proposition E.2. 
Now, we show that Notion 1 is a “weaker” notion than Notion 2, which aligns with our result in Propo-
sition E.1 that unconditional fairness guarantees are “weaker” than conditional fairness guarantees. More
specifically, we show in Proposition B.2 shows that for a given mapping and individually fair A, Notion 2 is
stronger than Notion 1 up to Lipschitz factors.
Proposition B.2. Let α ≥ 0.5 be a constant, and suppose that (Mu,v)u6=v∈U is a mapping and A is an
individually fair cohort selection mechanism. If A satisfies α-Notion 2, then A satisfies α-Notion 1.
Proof of Proposition B.2. Notion 2 (i.e. Definition 3.4.2) and individual fairness tell us that:
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|q2v,u(i)−q
2
u,v(i)| ≤ (α−0.5)D(u,v),
|p(u)− p(v)| ≤D(u,v).
We want to show that:
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|q1v,u(i)−q
1
u,v(i)| ≤ αD(u,v).
We can write the first condition as:
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|
q1v,u(i)
p(v)
−
q1u,v(i)
p(u)
| ≤ (α −0.5)D(u,v)
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|
p(u)q1v,u(i)
p(u)p(v)
−
p(v)q1u,v(i)
p(u)p(v)
| ≤ αD(u,v)
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|p(u)q1v,u(i)− p(v)q
1
u,v(i)| ≤ p(u)p(v)(α −0.5)D(u,v)
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|p(u)q1v,u(i)− p(u)q
1
u,v(i)+ p(u)q
1
u,v(i)− p(v)q
1
u,v(i)| ≤ p(u)p(v)(α −0.5)D(u,v).
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Now, we use the fact that |A|− |B|= |A|− |−B| ≤ |A+B|. We see that this means that
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|p(u)q1v,u(i)− p(u)q
1
u,v(i)|−
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|p(u)q1u,v(i)− p(v)q
1
u,v(i)| ≤ p(u)p(v)(α −0.5)D(u,v).
This means that:
1
2
p(u)
nu,v
∑
i=1
|q1v,u(i)−q
1
u,v(i)| ≤ p(u)p(v)(α −0.5)D(u,v)+
1
2
|p(u)− p(v)|
nu,v
∑
i=1
q1u,v(i)
1
2
nu,v
∑
i=1
|q1v,u(i)−q
1
u,v(i)| ≤
p(u)p(v)(α −0.5)D(u,v)+ 1
2
|p(u)− p(v)|p(u)
p(u)
≤ (p(v)(α −0.5)+
1
2
)D(u,v)
≤ αD(u,v).

We now show that satisfying α-Notion 1 (or α-Notion 2) is required for pipeline fairness when the metric
δF is of a certain form. That is, we consider metrics δ on (cohort, individual) pairs with the following
structure. For each pair of individuals u and v, consider the metric δu,v defined by δ restricted to the set
Pu,v = (Cu×{u})× (Cv×{v}). We focus on the case in which Pu,v has a partitioning into clusters s.t. δu,v
is large across clusters and small within clusters. (In fact, the condition that we place on each cluster bears
some resemblance to the standard requirements of an (α ,β )-cluster of a graph [23], though our condition is
adapted to metric spaces.) We formally define “(α ,β ) metrics” as follows:
Definition B.3 ((α ,β )-Metrics). Let d be a metric over some finite set S, and let β > α ≥ 0 be constants.
Suppose that there exists a partition of S into clusters that satisfies the following conditions: if s1,s2 ∈ S are
in the same cluster, then d(s1,s2)≤ α ; if s1,s2 ∈ S are in different clusters, then d(s1,s2)≥ β . Then, we say
that d is an (α ,β )-metric, and we call the partition into clusters the induced partition.22
Suppose that a metric δ over (cohort, individual) pairs has the property that for all pairs of individuals
u and v, δu,v is a (D(u,v),1)-metric. The collection of induced partitions for each δu,v gives a mapping.
We call this mapping a coarsest mapping for δ , because for every pair u and v, it is not possible for the
partition to merge two clusters and still respect δ (as per the requirements of Definition 3.1). Moreover, it
is straightforward to verify that that this mapping is the unique coarsest mapping, using the fact that δu,v is
a (D(u,v),1)-metric.
Now, suppose that δF is such that for all pairs of individuals u and v, 1α δ
F
u,v is a (D(u,v),
1
α )-metric.
For metrics of this form, we show that satisfying α-Notion 1 (resp. α-Notion 2) is necessary for pipeline
fairness: the intuition for necessity is that the conversion of 1α δ
F
u,v into a coarsest mapping is not lossy from a
fairness perspective. That is, if A does not satisfy α-Notion 1 (resp. α-Notion 2), we can construct a scoring
function violating pipeline fairness: this scoring function can take advantage of similar individuals having
different distributions of cohorts across clusters.
Our proofs will rely on a standard lemma about extensions of functions on metric spaces and we present
a proof for the sake of being self-contained.
Lemma B.4. Let α > 0 be a constant, and let d be a pseudo-metric over U and let U ′ ⊆U. If f :U ′→ [0,1]
is α-Lipschitz w.r.t. d|U ′ , then there exists a function g :U → [0,1] such that g|U ′ = f and that is α-Lipschitz
w.r.t d.
Proof. Let g′ :U → R be defined by g′(x) = infu∈U ′ { f (u)+αd(x,u)}. Observe that g
′|U ′ = f . Moreover,
∀x∈U , observe that for every ε > 0, there exists u∗ ∈U ′ such that: g′(x)≥ f (u∗)+αd(x,u∗)−ε . Moreover,
we have by definition that g′(y) ≤ f (u∗)+αd(y,u∗). Thus: g′(y)− g′(x) ≤ f (u∗)+αd(y,u∗)− ( f (u∗)+
22It is straightforward to verify that if such a partition exists, then it is unique.
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αd(x,u∗))+ ε ≤ α(d(y,u∗ − d(x,u∗))+ ε ≤ αd(x,y) + ε . Thus, g′ is α-Lipschitz w.r.t. d. Now, we let
g(x) = min(1,g′(x)). We see that g|U ′ = g
′|U ′ = f and g is α-Lipschitz w.rt. d since |g(y)− g(x)| ≤
|g′(y)−g′(x)|. 
We first prove that the conditions in Theorem 3.5 are necessary for mass-moving distance, using the
structure of (D(u,v), 1α )-metrics.
Theorem B.5 (Necessity for mass-moving-distance). Let F be a family of scoring functions, and let α ≥
1 be a constant. Suppose that δF has the property that for all pairs of individuals u and v, 1α d
F
u,v is a
(D(u,v), 1α )-metric. Let (Mu,v)u6=v∈U be the coarsest mapping for
1
α δ
F . Suppose that D(u,v) < 1αnu,v .
Suppose that A does not satisfy α-Notion 1 (resp. α-Notion 2) is not satisfied for (Mu,v)u6=v∈U . Moreover,
suppose that |p(u)− p(v)| = D(u,v). Then, A is not α-robust w.r.t. F for duncond,MMD (resp. dcond,MMD).
Proof of Theorem B.5. Suppose that A does not satisfy α-Notion 1 (resp. α-Notion 2) for (Mu,v)u6=v∈U .
Then, there exists some pair of individuals u and v such that TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u) > (α − 0.5)D(u,v) (resp.
TV (q2u,v,q
2
v,u) > αD(u,v)). We construct a scoring function g where the mass-moving distance between
S
N,A,g
u and S
N,A,g
v (resp. S
C,A,g
u and S
C,A,g
v ) is larger than αD(u,v).
Fix ε > 0 sufficiently small. As before, let Pu,v = (Cu×{u})∪ (Cv×{v}) be the set of all (cohort,
individual) pairs involving u or v. We define a scoring function f : Pu,v → [0,1]. As before, for every
1 ≤ i ≤ nu,v, let S(i) =
{
(C,u) ∈M−1u,v (i)
}
∪
{
(C,v) ∈M−1v,u (i)
}
be the (cohort, individual) pairs appearing
in cluster i. For (C,x) ∈ S(i), we take f (C,x) to be i(α + ε)D(u,v). Since D(u,v) < 1αnu,v , we can make ε
small enough so that all of the scores are in [0,1].
Now, we show that f is 1-Lipschitz with respect to δF restricted to the domain Pu,v, for sufficiently
small ε . Within each cluster, f is constant, so clearly it is 1-Lipschitz within each cluster. Now, con-
sider (cohort, individual) pairs in different clusters. If (C,x),(C′,y) are in different clusters, we know that
δF ((C,x),(C′,y))≥ 1 based on the fact that 1α d
F
u,v is a (D(u,v),
1
α )-metric, so d
F
u,v is a (αD(u,v),1)-metric.
Thus, f is 1-Lipschitz.
We apply Lemma B.4 to complete f into a function g : C ×U → [0,1] that is 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. δF .
We now show that the mass moving distance between S
N,A,g
u and S
N,A,g
v (resp. S
C,A,g
u and S
C,A,g
v ) is larger
than αD(u,v). Assume for sake of contradiction that the mass moving distance is ≤ αD(u,v). That would
mean that there exist γ˜1 and γ˜2, along with functions Z1 and Z2, that satisfy conditions 1 and 2 in the mass
moving distance definition for (α + ε/2)D(u,v). By the “mass does not move far” condition, we know that
for l = 1,2, the support of the probability measure Zl(i(α + ε)) ∈ ∆(γ˜l) must be disjoint from the support
of the probability measure Zl( j(α + ε)) ∈ ∆(γ˜l) for any 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ nu,v. Thus, TV (γ˜1, γ˜2) must be at
least TV (SN,A,gu ,S
N,A,g
v ) (resp. TV (S
C,A,g
u ,S
C,A,g
v )). We see that TV (S
N,A,g
u ,S
N,A,g
v ) = TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u)+0.5|(1−
p(u))− (1− p(v))| = (α + ε)D(u,v) (resp. TV (SC,A,gu ,S
C,A,g
v ) = TV (q2u,v,q
2
v,u) = (α + ε)D(u,v)), which is
a contradiction. This proves the desired statement. 
When are our condition in Theorem 3.5 also “tight” for expected score fairness? We prove that our defini-
tion is necessary (up to Lipschitz constants) for expected score, again using the structure of (D(u,v), 1α )-metrics.
Theorem B.6 (Necessity for expected score). Let F be a family of scoring functions, and suppose that δF
has the property that for all pairs of individuals u and v, 1α δ
F
u,v is a (D(u,v),
1
α )-metric. Let (Mu,v)u6=v∈U
be the coarsest mapping for 1α δ
F . Suppose that (α + 0.5)-Notion 1 (resp. α-Notion 2) is not satisfied for
(Mu,v)u6=v∈U . Moreover, suppose that |p(u)− p(v)| = D(u,v). Then, A is not α-robust w.r.t. F for d
uncond,E
(resp. dcond,E).
Proof of Theorem B.6. Suppose that A does not satisfy α-Notion 1 (resp. α-Notion 2) for (Mu,v)u6=v∈U . (See
Definition 3.4.) Then, there exists some pair of individuals u and v such that TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u)> αD(u,v) (resp.
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TV (q2u,v,q
2
v,u)>αD(u,v)). We construct a scoring function gwhere |E[S
N,A,g
u ]−E[S
N,A,g
v ]|>αD(u,v) (resp.
|E[SC,A,gu ]−E[S
C,A,g
v ]|> αD(u,v)).
As before, let Pu,v = (Cu × {u}) ∪ (Cv × {v}) be the set of all (cohort, individual) pairs involving
u or v. We define a scoring function f : Pu,v → {0,1}. As before, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ nu,v, let S(i) ={
(C,u) ∈M−1u,v (i)
}
∪
{
(C,v) ∈M−1v,u (i)
}
be the (cohort, individual) pairs appearing in cluster i. Let’s parti-
tion {1, . . . ,nu,v} into two groups P1 and P2 as follows. WLOG, suppose that p(u)≥ p(v). We define P1 such
that q1u,v(i) ≥ q
1
v,u(i) (resp. q
2
u,v(i) ≥ q
2
v,u(i)) and define P2 such that q
1
u,v(i) < q
1
v,u(i) (resp. q
2
u,v(i) < q
2
v,u(i)).
For i ∈ P1 and (C,x) ∈ S(i), we take f (C,x) to be 1. For i ∈ P2 and (C,x) ∈ S(i), we take f (C,x) to be 0.
Now, we show that f is 1-Lipschitz with respect to δF restricted to the domain Pu,v, for sufficiently
small ε . Within each cluster, f is constant, so clearly it is 1-Lipschitz within each cluster. Now, con-
sider (cohort, individual) pairs in different clusters. If (C,x),(C′,y) are in different clusters, we know that
δF ((C,x),(C′,y)) = 1 based on the fact that 1α d
F
u,v is a (D(u,v),
1
α )-metric, so d
F
u,v is a (αD(u,v),1)-metric.
Thus, f is 1-Lipschitz.
We apply Lemma B.4 to complete f into a function g : C ×U → [0,1] that is 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. δF . We
now show that |E[SN,A,gu ]−E[S
N,A,g
v ]| > αD(u,v) (resp. |E[S
C,A,g
u ]−E[S
C,A,g
v ]| > αD(u,v)). We see that
|E[SN,A,gu ]−E[S
N,A,g
v ]| =
∣∣∑i∈P1 q1u,v(i)−∑i∈P1 q1v,u(i)∣∣ = TV (q1u,v,q1v,u) > αD(u,v). (Similarly, we see that
|E[SC,A,gu ]−E[S
C,A,g
v ]|=
∣∣∑i∈P1 q2u,v(i)−∑i∈P1 q2v,u(i)∣∣= TV (q2u,v,q2v,u)> αD(u,v).) 
Theorem B.6 is somewhat surprising for the following reason: by Theorem 3.5, Notion 1 (resp. Notion 2) in
the theorem statement actually gives the stronger notion of mass-moving distance fairness, but we actually
show that it is necessary even for the weaker notion of expected score. We can view this result as telling us
that for certain classes of post-processing functions, we get the robustness w.r.t mass-moving distance “for
free” as a consequence of robustness w.r.t expected score.
APPENDIX C. EXTENDED DETAILS ON COHORT SELECTION MECHANISMS
Two mechanisms for fair cohort selection were given in [6] based on converting an individually fair clas-
sifier for independent classification into a mechanism to select exactly n individuals. The first, “Permute then
Classify” applies the fair classifier to each element in random order and either (1) stops when n elements are
selected or (2) chooses the remaining unclassified elements to get a total of n. The second, “Weighted Sam-
pling” samples from the set of all cohorts of size n where each cohort is assigned a probability proportional
to the sum of the “weights” assigned to each element in the cohort by the fair classifier.
In this appendix, we give the formal specifications for each of these mechanisms, show that they satisfy
the monotonicity property required in Lemma 4.6, and give an extension of weighted sampling to allow
individually fair selection from an arbitrary set of cohorts.
C.1. Permute then Classify.
Mechanism C.1 (PermuteThenClassify [6]). Given a universe U , a cohort size n≤ |U | and an individually
fair classifier C : U → {0,1}, first choose a permutation pi ∼ S|U | uniformly at random random from the
symmetric group on |U |. Initialize an empty cohort l. Evaluating the elements of U in the order specified
by pi , apply C to each element. If C(u) = 1 and there are fewer than n elements in the cohort, add u to the
cohort. If there are no more than n−|l| elements left to be evaluated (i.e., the only way to select n total is to
accept all remaining elements), then add all remaining elements in the permutation to l.
Theorem C.2 (Permute then Classify is individually fair [6] ). PermuteThenClassify is a solution to the
Cohort Selection Problem for any C that is individually fair when operating on all elements of the universe.
To satisfy the requirements of Lemma 4.6, it suffices to show that the Permute then Classify mechanism
is monotone, i.e. if an individual u is preferred to v, then the probability of choosing any cohort with u
swapped for v is larger than the probability of selecting the original cohort.
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Lemma C.3 (PermuteThenClassify is monotone). The permute then classify mechanism is monotone, i.e.,
Pr[PC,n,N = l ∪ x] ≥ Pr[PC,n,N = l ∪ y] if Pr[C(x) = 1] ≥ Pr[C(y) = 1], where PC,n,N is the permute then
classify mechanism instantiated with a randomized classifier C :U× r→{0,1} choosing n elements from a
set of N.
Proof. Recall that Permute then Classify first chooses a permutation uniformly at random from the symmet-
ric group on [N] pi ∼ S([N]) for an input of size N. It then runs C on each element until either there are n
elements ”accepted” by C, or there only enough elements left in the permutation to make n, in which case
all remaining elements are selected.
Fix a pair of elements x and y. Consider any permutation pi and any set of elements l such that |l|= n−1
and x /∈ l and y /∈ l. Without loss of generality, suppose that x appears before y in pi . Call the permutation
with x and y swapped pi ′.
Call the elements of l that appear before x, l1, those that appear in between x and y l2 and those that appear
after y l3.
Given pi, the probability of choosingC∪x= Pr[l1]∗Pr[C(x)|l1]∗Pr[l2|l1,C(x)]∗Pr[ ¯C(y)]∗Pr[l3|l1, l2,C(x), ¯C(y)].
Notice that this statement is equivalent with x and y switched under pi ′.
Given pi , the probability of choosingC∪y= Pr[l1]∗Pr[ ¯C(x)|l1]∗Pr[l2|l1, ¯C(x)]∗Pr[C(y)]∗Pr[l3|l1, l2,C(y), ¯C(x)].
As above, this statement is equivalent with y and x switched under pi ′.
Notice that Pr[l3|l1, l2,C(x), ¯C(y)] = Pr[l3|l1, l2,C(y), ¯C(x)], etc as the probability is only dependent on having
a sufficient number of slots left.
Thus, we can relate the probability of C∪ x chosen under pi or pi ′ to the probability of choosing C∪ y :
Pr[C∪ x|pi ∨pi ′]−Pr[C∪ y|pi ∨pi ′] = Pr[l1, l2, l3][(1−C(y))C(x)− (1−C(x))C(y)]∗2
Pr[C∪ x|pi ∨pi ′]−Pr[C∪ y|pi ∨pi ′]≥ 0
Thus, we conclude that Permute then Classify is monotone.

C.2. Weighted Sampling. First we introduce the weighted sampling mechanism, as described in [6].
Mechanism C.4 (Weighted Sampling [6]). Given an individually fair classifier C :U → [0,1], and a cohort
size n, define the L to be the set of subsets of U of size n. Assign each subset l ∈ L weight w(l) ←
∑u∈lE[C(u)]. Define a distribution over sets of size n, X such that the weight of l under X is
w(l)
∑l′∈Lw(l
′) .
Choose a set according to X as output.
Theorem C.5 (Weighted sampling is individually fair [6]). For any individually fair classifier C such that
the Pru∼U [C(u) = 1]≥ 1/|U |, weighted sampling is individually fair.
Notice that the specification of the weighted sampling mechanism immediately implies that the mecha-
nism is monotone, as w(C) =w({C\{u}}∪{v})+C(u)−C(v). Despite this monotonicity property, Weight-
edSampling still runs into issues with Notion 2.
Proposition C.6. Suppose that WeightedSampling is run with ∑u∈U w(u) = 1. It does not satisfy α1-Notion
2 (Definition 3.4.2) for any constant α1 that is independent of |U |, k (the size of the cohort), {w(u)}u∈U , D .
Proof. To show this counter-example, we take the (realistic) infinite sequence of (k,U) pairs where k<<U
and choose weights in terms of these quantities, and show that no such constant α1 independent of k and
U exists. Let S = ∑u∈U w(u), which we set to 1. Suppose that w(y) = 0.5 for some y ∈ U . Suppose
that w(u) = 0 and w(v) = S
(
k logk
|U |−1 −
k−1
|U |−1
)
|U |−1
|U |−k . A straightforward calculation using the expression for
sampling probability in Weighted Sampling and simplifying shows that p(x) = w(x)
S
|U |−k
|U |−1 +
k−1
|U |−1 for all
x ∈ X . Plugging this in, we obtain that p(u) = k−1|U |−1 and p(v) =
k logk
|U |−1 .
We take a particular set of cohorts where the contribution to total variation distance will blow-up. Let’s
consider all cohorts C with y,u and k− 2 elements not including v. Let’s also consider their corresponding
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mapped sets using the swapping mapping. Observe that the probability that C = C′ ∪ {u} is chosen is
w(u)+∑x∈C′ w(x)
N
and the probability that C′ ∪{v} is chosen is
w(v)+∑x∈C′ w(x)
N
where N =
(|U |−1
k−1
)
S. Thus the
contribution to the total variation distance of C is:
Q=
∣∣∣∣w(u)+∑x∈C′ w(x)Np(u) − w(v)+∑x∈C′ w(x)Np(v)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1(|U |−1
k−1
) (w(u)/S
p(u)
−
w(v)/S
p(v)
+
∑x∈C′ w(x)
S
(
1
p(u)
−
1
p(v)
))∣∣∣∣∣ .
Now, observe that
w(u)/S
p(u)
=
w(u)/S
(w(u)/S)
[
|U |−k
|U |−1
]
+ k−1|U |−1
=
|U |−1
|U |− k
(w(u)/S) |U |−k|U |−1
(w(u)/S)
[
|U |−k
|U |−1
]
+ k−1|U |−1
.
This is equal to:
|U |−1
|U |− k
(
1−
k−1
|U |−1
p(u)
)
.
Now, this means that
w(u)/S
p(u)
−
w(v)/S
p(v)
=
k−1
|U |− k
(
1
p(v)
−
1
p(u)
)
.
Thus, we know that
Q=
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ 1(|U |−1
k−1
)
∣∣∣∣∑x∈C′ w(x)S − k−1|U |− k
∣∣∣∣ .
Using the fact that y ∈C, we can rewrite this as:
Q=
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ 1(|U |−1
k−1
)
∣∣∣∣w(y)+∑x6=y∈C′ w(x)S − k−1|U |− k
∣∣∣∣ .
Observe that
w(y)+∑x6=y∈C′ w(x)
S
≥ 0.5
S
= 0.5. If |U |>> k, then this is bigger than k−1|U |−k . Thus, we see that:
Q≥
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ 1(|U |−1
k−1
)
∣∣∣∣0.5− k−1|U |− k
∣∣∣∣ .
When |U |>> k, we see that:
Q≥
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ 1(|U |−1
k−1
)0.4.
Now, let’s sum over all cohorts C containing y,u and k− 2 elements not including v. Thus, there are(|U |−3
k−2
)
cohorts to sum over, so we obtain:∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣
(|U |−3
k−2
)
(|U |−1
k−1
)0.25=
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣0.4 (k−1)|U |−1 |U |− k|U |−2 .
When |U |>> k, this can be lower bounded by:∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣0.25 (k−1)|U |−1 .
Using our settings for p(u) and p(v), we see that
∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣= |U |−1k−1 − |U |−1k logk . When k is sufficiently large,
the distance becomes roughly 0.25 instead of k logk|U |−1 , so there is no such constant α1 since
|U |−1
k logk
is unbounded
as |U | → ∞ when k << |U |. 
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C.3. Adapting weighted sampling for structured cohort sets. Permute then Classify and Weighted Sam-
pling behave almost as if individuals are classified independently, i.e., the probability of selecting an individ-
ual depends only on their independent classification probability and whether there is space left in the cohort.
However, these solutions have a considerable drawback in practice: they are unstructured. For example,
a college admitting a class of 70% female students or 90% athletes would cause significant churn in the
resources and facilities needed year over year. To best utilize its resources, and perhaps more importantly to
expose students to classmates with a variety of backgrounds and interests, the college would naturally want
to impose some structure on the classes admitted.
Fortunately, weighted sampling can be adapted to select cohorts with some underlying structure in an
individually fair way. Given a set of “acceptable” cohorts C , i.e. cohorts satisfying some property like a
diverse set of student interests, weighted sampling (with weights based on a solution to a linear program
constraining differences in selection probability for each individual, as in the original linear program in [5])
can be used to select a single cohort. Roughly speaking, the constraints for solving this linear program
concern the number of cohorts in C in which each individual appears, not their relative qualification or
distances within these cohorts. While we can imagine such a setup being used for good reason, it can also
be abused to construct cohorts that justify discrimination in later stages. Returning to the malicious example
from the introduction, notice that a set of “acceptable cohorts” could be the set of cohorts which mostly
satisfy the property that the most talented person in the cohort is not a minority candidate, giving the veneer
of individual fairness to a pipeline explicitly constructed to unfairly discriminate.
Theorem C.7. Given a universe U and a distance metric D and a set of permissible cohorts C , such that
the subset of permissible cohorts C u containing an individual u and the subset of permissible cohorts C v
containing an individual v satisfy
||C u|−|C v||
|C | ≤D(u,v) and there exists a subset of cohorts C
P ⊆C such that
no element appears in more than one cohort in C P and C P forms a partition of U, then there exists a set of
weights for the cohorts in C such that choosing a single cohort by sampling proportional to these weights
results in individual fairness.
Proof. First, we translate the requirements for individual fairness and constructing the set of weights into a
linear program with variables wi for each cohort in C .
{wi|i ∈ [|C |]} s.t.


wi ≥ 0,
∑iwi = 1
∑i∈C u wi−∑i∈C v wi ≤D(u,v)∀u,v ∈U
∑i∈C v wi−∑i∈C u wi ≤D(u,v)∀u,v ∈U
To solve the system, we take the following steps:
(1) Solve the system without the non-negativity constraint.
(2) Determine the maximum magnitude negative weight, and call the magnitude w∗.
(3) Add w∗ to all weights in the original solution.
(4) Take y= ∑iwi = 1+ |C |w∗.
(5) Divide all weights by y.
Notice that Steps 3-5 ensure that all weights are positive in the total sum of the weights is equal to 1.
Thus it remains to characterize under what conditions the distance constraints are also satisfied after the
adjustments in Steps 3-5. Given the requirement that a subset of C exactly partition U , there always exists
a solution to the system which is to place equal weight on each of the cohorts in the partition subset.
Notice that the adjustments do not violate the distance constraints when each element appears an equal
number of sets. To handle the more general case, take yu,v = ||C
u|− |C v||, i.e. the difference in the number
of cohorts u and v appear in. Without loss of generality, assume that u participates in more cohorts than v.
To satisfy the distance constraints we need
(yu,vw∗+ ∑
i∈C u
wi− ∑
i∈C v
wi)
1
y
≤D(u,v)
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which follows from applying the steps above.
In the worst case, the original solution took on the maximum distance between u and v. Substituting
∑i∈C u wi−∑i∈C v wi = D(u,v),
(yu,vw∗+D(u,v))
1
y
≤D(u,v)
yu,vw∗ ≤D(u,v)(y−1)
Substituting for the value of y:
yu,vw∗ ≤D(u,v)|C |w∗
yu,v
|C |
≤D(u,v)
Thus, so long as the condition requiring that every pair of individuals participate in a similar number of
cohorts is satisfied, the theorem statement holds. 
Thus, as long as the difference in number of sets participated in for each pair as a fraction of the total
number of sets is less than the distance between the pairs and the permissible cohorts and for partition of
the universe, a solution can be found. Such requirements are reasonably easy to check before attempting to
solve the system and in specifying the cohorts.
APPENDIX D. DETAILS FOR SECTION 4
D.1. A pathological scoring function family. Unfortunately, it is not possible to achieve robustness with
respect to arbitrary families of intra-cohort individually fair mechanisms: there are pathological classes of
scoring functions in which there is no robust cohort selection mechanism. Example D.1 below illustrates
a set of permissible cohorts C and scoring function f for which there is no robust, individually fair cohort
selection mechanism.
Example D.1. Consider a universe U = {a,b,c} of three equivalent individuals, and a fairness metric such
that D(x,y) = 0 for all x,y ∈U . Suppose that C = {a,b},{a,c},{b,c} and f is a scoring function defined
so that: f ({a,b},a) = f ({a,b},b) = 0, f ({a,c},a) = f ({a,c},c) = 1, and f ({b,c},b) = f ({b,c},c) = 0.5.
If A is an individually fair cohort selection mechanism, then A({a,b}) = A({a,c}) = A({b,c}). The
unconditional expected scores are E[SN,A, fa ] = 1/3, E[S
N,A, f
b ] = 1/6, and E[S
N,A, f
c ] = 1/2, and the conditional
scores are E[SN,A, fa ] = 1/2, E[S
N,A, f
b ] = 1/4, and E[S
N,A, f
c ] = 3/4. Thus, no individually fair cohort selection
mechanism A is robust with respect to f .
The fundamental issue in Example D.1 is that f is permitted to deviate wildly between cohorts, and as a result
d{ f} is large on cohort contexts that look intuitively identical. In practice, if the original cohort selection
mechanism has some control over the determination of C , such pathological cases may be avoidable.
D.2. Proofs for Section 4. We prove Proposition 4.2, restated here.
Proposition D.2 (Restatement of Proposition D.2). Consider the mapping that, for each pair of individuals
u and v, places all of the cohort contexts in (Cu×{u})∪(Cv×{v}) into the same cluster. If A is individually
fair, then A satisfies 0.5-Notion 1 and 0.5-Notion 2 w.r.t. this mapping.
Proof. Pick any pair of individuals u and v. Using the mapping described in the proposition statement, we
know that TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u) = 0.5|p(u)− p(v)| ≤ 0.5D(u,v), and TV (q
2
u,v,q
2
v,u) = 0, as desired. 
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D.3. Proofs for Section 4.1. We prove Lemma 4.6, restated here. The intuition for the link between the
monotonicity property and the swapping mapping is that the probability masses on a cohort containing u
and a cohort containing v that are paired in the swapping mapping are directionally aligned.
Lemma D.3 (Restatement of Lemma D.3). Suppose that C ⊆ 2U is the set of cohorts of size k. If A is
monotonic, then A satisfies 0.5-Notion 1 for the swapping mapping.
Proof. Pick any pair of individuals u and v. WLOG assume that p(u)≥ p(v). Since A is monotonic, we see
that
TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u) = 0.5 ∑
C⊆U,|C|=k−1,u,v6∈C
|A(C∪{u})−A(C∪{v})|
= 0.5 ∑
C⊆U,|C|=k−1,u,v6∈C
(A(C∪{u})−A(C∪{v}))
= 0.5
(
∑
C⊆U,|C|=k−1,u,v6∈C
A(C∪{u})
)
−0.5
(
∑
C∈C ,|C|=k−1,u,v6∈C
A(C∪{v})
)
= 0.5
[(
∑
C⊆U,|C|=k−1,u,v6∈C
A(C∪{u})
)
+
(
∑
C⊆U,|C|=k,u,v∈C
A(C)
)]
−0.5
[(
∑
C⊆U,|C|=k,u,v∈C
A(C)
)
+
(
∑
C⊆U,|C|=k−1,u,v6∈C
A(C∪{v})
)]
= 0.5
(
∑
C⊆U,u∈C
A(C)
)
−0.5
(
∑
C⊆U,v∈C
A(C)
)
= 0.5p(u)−0.5p(v) ≤ 0.5D(u,v).

We now analyze the Conditioning Mechanism (Mechanism 4.7), restated here:
Mechanism D.4 (Conditioning Mechanism). Given a weight function w :U → [0,1], for each u ∈U , inde-
pendently draw from 1u ∼ Bern(w(u)). Denote the set of individuals with 1u = 1 as S. If |S| ≥ k, choose a
cohort of k individuals uniformly at random from S. Otherwise, repeat.
We show that under mild conditions, the Conditioning Mechanism is individually fair, robust, and allows
for a degree of mechanism expressiveness.
Lemma D.5. Let k be the size of the cohorts in C , and assume that k ≥ 2. Let α1, α2, and α3 be constants
defined as follows: α1 = 1.6 when k ≥ 12 and α1 = 13 when 2≤ k≤ 12, α2 = 12, and α3 = 0 when k < 54
and α3 = 0.2 when k ≥ 54 and α3 = 0.485 when k ≥ 180. Consider the Conditioning Mechanism with
1/α1-individually fair weights satisfying ∑x∈U w(x) ≥ 3k/2. The mechanism is individually fair, satisfies
α2-Notion 2, and concludes in expectation within α1 rounds. Moreover, if ∑x∈U w(x) = 3k/2, then |p(u)−
p(v)≥ α3|w(u)−w(v)| and α3w(u)≤ p(u)≤ α1w(u).
Thus, with a lower bound on the total sum of weights, the Conditioning Mechanism satisfies Notion 2.
Moreover, if the sum of weights is tuned exactly to 3k/2, then the resulting mechanism is also expressive:
the difference between |p(u)− p(v)| ≥ 0.485|w(u)−w(v)| for sufficiently large k, so dissimilar people have
dissimilar probabilities of being selected. Moreover, by setting w(x) = 0, the mechanism will make x never
appear, and by setting w(x) = 1, the mechanism will make p(x) ≥ 0.485 for sufficiently large k.
Now, we prove Lemma D.5. We first prove the following helpful Proposition.
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Proposition D.6. The Conditioning Mechanism run with individually fair weights w(x) (i.e. |w(x)−w(y)| ≤
D(x,y)) is η1-individually fair and satisfies η2-Notion 2 for η1 and η2 defined as follows. For subsets
S⊆ S′ ⊆U, let:
PS
′
[S] =
(
∏
x∈S
w(x)
)(
∏
x6∈S,x∈S′
(1−w(x))
)
.
Let:
η1 =
(
∑
S⊆U,|S|≥k
PU [S]
)−1
.
η2 = 4
(
1+max
(
1
k
,
∑S⊆U,u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2(P
U\{u,v}[S]
∑S⊆U,u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1(P
U\{u,v}[S]
))
.
Moreover, the following equalities are true:
p(u) =
w(u)∑S⊆U,u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S] · k|S|+1 )
∑S⊆U,|S|≥kP
U [S]
.
|p(u)− p(v)| =
|w(u)−w(v)|∑S⊆U,|S|≥kP
U\{u,v}[S] k|S|+1
∑S⊆U,|S|≥kP
U [S]
.
Proof. The proof consists of two main parts. First, we derive the appropriate expressions for p(u) and p(v)
to show that the conditioning mechanism is η1-individually fair. Second, we prove that the conditioning
mechanism satisfies η2-Notion 2 (Definition 3.4): we do this by analyzing the total variation distance be-
tween the distributions for u and v by breaking into three cases depending on whether u or v or both are in
the initial set selected by the mechanism.
Part 1. Observe that PS
′
[S] is the probability that the set S is initially chosen when the Conditioning
Mechanism were to be run on the universe S′. Although the actual universe isU , we introduce this quantity
since it turns out to be convenient in the analysis. Observe the probability of having ≥ k elements in the set
initially chosen by the Conditioning Mechanism is ∑S⊆U,|S|≥kP
U [S] = η−11 . (Note: for convenience, we will
write ∑S to mean ∑S⊆U in subsequent formulae for brevity.).
First, we compute p(u). Suppose a set S′ of ≥ k elements is initially drawn by the Conditioning Mecha-
nism. If u 6∈ S′, then u is not in the cohort. Otherwise, there is a k|S′| probability that u is in the cohort. In this
case, let S= S′ \{u}. We see that this means that:
p(u) = η1 ∑
u∈S′,|S′|≥k
(PU [S′] ·
k
|S′|
) =
w(u)∑u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S] · k|S|+1 )
∑S,|S|≥kP
U [S]
.
We can also write
p(u) =
w(u)w(v)∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−2(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+2)+w(u)(1−w(v))∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+1)
∑S,|S|≥kP
U [S]
.
p(v) =
w(u)w(v)∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−2(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+2)+w(v)(1−w(u))∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+1)
∑S,|S|≥kP
U [S]
.
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This implies that
|p(u)− p(v)| =
|w(u)−w(v)|∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+1)
∑S,|S|≥kP
U [S]
≤
|w(u)−w(v)|∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u,v}[S])
∑S,|S|≥kP
U [S]
≤
|w(u)−w(v)|
∑S,|S|≥kP
U [S]
= η1|w(u)−w(v)|.
Thus, the conditioning mechanism is η1-individually fair.
Part 2. Now, we compute the TV distance to show the Notion 2 (Definition 3.4.2) properties. Let S be
the set of elements initially selected by Conditioning Mechanism. We condition on the event |S| ≥ k and
compute the total variation distance. There are three relevant cases:
(1) u and v are both in S
(2) u is in S and v is not in S
(3) v is in S and u is not in S
We define:
κ1 = ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+1
)
κ2 = ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−2
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
).
In this notation, we have that:
p(u) = η1w(u)(w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1)
and
p(v) = η1w(v)(w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1.
Let S be a subset of size of at least k that is initially chosen by the mechanism, and let R⊆ S be the size k
subset that is finally chosen. We see that the probability R is chosen given S is 1
(|S|k )
, and the probability that S
is chosen is η1P
U [S], where the η1 comes from the fact that if the mechanism starts over if it chooses a set of
size< k. We now consider (1), (2), and (3) separately, and do a triangle inequality between the contributions
to the total variation distance of these three cases. For each of these cases, there are three possible states for
R. Either
(a) R contains u and v,
(b) R contains one of u and v, or
(c) R contains neither.
First, we consider case (1). Here, case (c) contributes nothing to the TV distance.
Case (a) contributes η1
∣∣∣∣∣
PU [S] 1
(|S|k )
p(u) −
PU [S] 1
(|S|k )
p(v)
∣∣∣∣∣ by construction. Summing over possible R and S for this
case, we see that that the contribution to TV distance is:
1
2
η1 ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
1(|S|
k
)
(
∑
u,v∈R⊆S,|R|=k
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣
)
.
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Case (b), due to the swapping mapping (Definition 4.4) and symmetry, contributes η1
∣∣∣∣∣
PU [S] 1
(|S|k )
p(u) −
PU [S] 1
(|S|k )
p(v)
∣∣∣∣∣.
For case (b), if u ∈ R, we let R′ = R\{u} and if v ∈ R, we let R′ = R\{v}. Summing over possible R and S
for this case, we see that the contribution to TV distance is:
1
2
η1 ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
1(|S|
k
)
(
∑
R′⊆S,|R′|=k−1,u,v6∈R′
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣
)
.
Thus, the total contribution to the total variation distance for (1) is:
1
2
η1 ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
1(|S|
k
)
(
∑
u,v∈R⊆S,|R|=k
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
R′⊆S,|R′|=k−1,u,v6∈R′
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣
)
.
We can write this as:
1
2
η1
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
1(|S|
k
)
(
∑
u,v∈R⊆S,|R|=k
1+ ∑
R′⊆S,|R′|=k−1,u,v6∈R′
1
)
,
which is equal to:
1
2
η1
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
(|S|−2
k−2
)
+
(|S|−2
k−1
)
(|S|
k
) = 1
2
η1
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
(|S|−1
k−1
)
(|S|
k
) ,
which is equal to:
1
2
η1
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v∈S,|S|≥k
PU [S]
k
|S|
=
1
2
η1w(u)w(v)κ2
∣∣∣∣ 1p(u) − 1p(v)
∣∣∣∣ .
This can be written as:
1
2
∣∣∣∣ w(v)κ2w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1 −
w(u)κ2
w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1
∣∣∣∣= 12 κ1κ2|w(v)−w(u)|(w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1)(w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1)
Now we consider cases (2) and (3), which follow symmetric arguments. Of the three possible states for
R, (a) is not possible for cases (2) and (3) and (c) contributes nothing to TV distance. Thus, we only need to
consider (b). With the swapping mapping, we can match u∈R⊆ Swith v∈ (R\{u})∪{v}⊆ (S\{u})∪{v}.
Let S′ = S \ {u} and R′ = R \ {u}. This contributes η1P
U\{u,v}[S′] 1
(|S
′ |+1
k )
∣∣∣w(u)(1−w(v))p(u) − w(v)(1−w(u))p(v)
∣∣∣ to the
total variation distance. Summing over S and R for this case, the total contribution to the total variation
distance is:
1
2
η1 ∑
u,v6∈S′,|S′|≥k−1
PU\{u,v}[S′]
1(|S′|+1
k
)
(
∑
R′⊆S′,|R′|=k−1
∣∣∣∣w(u)(1−w(v))p(u) − w(v)(1−w(u))p(v)
∣∣∣∣ .
)
.
This can be written as:
1
2
∑
u,v6∈S′,|S′|≥k−1
PU\{u,v}[S′]
1(|S′|+1
k
)
(
∑
R′⊆S′,|R′|=k−1
∣∣∣∣ (1−w(v))w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1 −
(1−w(u))
w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1
∣∣∣∣ ,
)
.
which can be simplified
1
2
∣∣∣∣ (1−w(v))w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1 −
(1−w(u))
w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v6∈S′,|S′|≥k−1
PU\{u,v}[S′]
1(|S′|+1
k
)
(
∑
R′⊆S′,|R′|=k−1
1,
)
,
which is equal to:
1
2
∣∣∣∣ (1−w(v))w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1 −
(1−w(u))
w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v6∈S′,|S′|≥k−1
PU\{u,v}[S′]
( |S′|
k−1
)
(|S′|+1
k
) ,
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1
2
∣∣∣∣ (1−w(v))w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1 −
(1−w(u))
w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1
∣∣∣∣ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
PU\{u,v}[S]
k
|S|+1
1
2
∣∣∣∣ (1−w(v))κ1w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1 −
(1−w(u))κ1
w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1
∣∣∣∣ ,
1
2
κ1κ2|w(v)−w(u)|
(w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1)(w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1)
.
Now, we are ready to put these cases together to compute the overall total variation distances. The total
variation distance contribution arising from cases (1), (2), and (3) is bounded by:
1
2
2κ1κ2|w(v)−w(u)|
(w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1)(w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1)
.
We wish to upper bound this by η2|w(v)−w(u)|. Equivalently, we wish to lower bound its reciprocal is
lower bounded. Taking the reciprocal and simplifying yield:
(w(v)κ2+(1−w(v))κ1)(w(u)κ2+(1−w(u))κ1)
κ1κ2|w(v)−w(u)|
=
(w(v)w(u)κ22 +κ1κ2(w(u)(1−w(v))+w(v)(1−w(u)))+κ
2
1 (1−w(v))(1−w(u))
κ1κ2|w(v)−w(u)|
.
=
(w(v)w(u)κ2κ1 +(w(u)(1−w(v))+w(v)(1−w(u)))+
κ1
κ2
(1−w(v))(1−w(u))
|w(v)−w(u)|
.
Notice that max((w(v)w(u),w(u)(1−w(v)),w(v)(1−w(u)),(1−w(u))(1−w(v))) ≥ 0.25. Thus, the
numerator is lower bounded by 0.25min
(
κ1
κ2
, κ2κ1
)
. Thus, the whole expression is≥ 1
4|w(v)−w(u)|min
(
κ1
κ2
, κ2κ1
)
.
Hence, the total variation distance is upper bounded by 4|w(v)−w(u)|max
(
κ1
κ2
, κ2κ1
)
. Now, it suffices to show
that max
(
κ1
κ2
, κ2κ1
)
≤
(
1+max
(
1
k
,
∑S⊆U,u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2(P
U\{u,v}[S]
∑S⊆U,u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1(PU\{u,v}[S]
))
Observe that
κ2 = ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−2
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
)
= ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
)+ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
)
≤ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
)+ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+1
).
Thus,
κ2
κ1
≤ 1+
∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+2 )
∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+1 )
≤ 1+
∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2(P
U\{u,v}[S] · k|S|+2)
∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+1)
.
Also, observe that
κ1 = ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+1
)
≤
k+1
k
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
)
≤
k+1
k
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−2
(PU\{u,v}[S] ·
k
|S|+2
).
so κ1κ2 ≤
k+1
k
. This proves the desired result.
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
Now, we are ready to prove LemmaD.5. To show tail bounds, we use the standard multiplicative Chernoff
bound, which we recall here for sake of completeness:
Theorem D.7. Let X = ∑ni=1Xi, where Xi = 1 with probability pi and Xi = 0 with probability 1− pi, and all
Xi are independent. Let µ = E[X ] = ∑
n
i=1 pi. Then the following bounds hold:
(1) Upper tail: P[X ≥ (1+δ )µ ]≤ e−
δ2
3
µ for all 0< δ < 1,
(2) Lower tail: P[X ≤ (1−δ )µ ]≤ e−µ
δ2
2 for all 0< δ < 1.
(At δ = 1/3, these bounds become e−
1
27 µ and e−
1
18
µ .)
We use Theorem D.7 to prove Lemma D.5.
Proof of Lemma D.5. The main ingredient of our proof is Proposition D.6. First, we prove some upper
bounds on the values η1 and η2 in Proposition D.6 for the case of ∑x∈U w(x)≥ 3k/2.
Bounding η1: We wish to bound η1 = (P[|S| ≥ k])
−1
. We use Theorem D.7 (a Chernoff bound), since
S is a sum of independent indicator random variables with weights according to w(x). Here the mean is
µ = ∑x∈U w(x)≥ 3k/2, and we take δ = 1/3, to obtain that P[|S| ≤ k]≤ e
− 3k
2·18 = e−
k
12 . Thus, we know that
P[|S| ≥ k]≥ 1− e−
k
12 , so η1 ≤
1
1−e−
k
12
. When k ≥ 12, we can upper bound η1 by 1.6, and when 1≤ k ≤ 12,
we can upper bound η1 by 13. We define α1 in the theorem statement based on these values.
Bounding η2: We give an upper bound on ∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1P
U\{u,v}[S] in terms of ∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2 P
U\{u,v}[S].
Consider an association between sets of size k− 1 and sets of size k− 2, where each set of size k− 1 is
mapped to the k− 1 subsets of size k− 2. We consider the probability to be equidistributed between the
associated sets of size k− 2. For a set |S| = k− 1 and subset |S′| = k− 2, the associated probability on S′
is PU\{u,v}[S] 1
k−1 = P
U\{u,v}[S′] 1
k−1
w(x)
1−w(x) , where x = S\S
′. Let’s assume we perform this process for all S
such that u,v 6∈ S and |S| = k−1, and aggregate the probabilities defined above on sets of size k−2 across
all of the different S. Then, for a set S′ of size k− 1 such that u,v 6∈ S′, the probability is x 6∈ S′ to obtain
∑x6∈S′,x6=u,vP
U\{u,v}[S′] 1
k−1
w(x)
1−w(x) = P
U\{u,v}[S] 1
k−1 ∑x6∈S′,x6=u,v
w(x)
1−w(x) . This means that
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1
PU\{u,v}[S] = ∑
u,v6∈S,|S′|=k−2
PU\{u,v}[S′]
1
k−1 ∑
x6∈S′,x6=u,v
w(x)
1−w(x)
≥ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S′ |=k−2
PU\{u,v}[S′]
1
k−1 ∑
x6∈S′,x6=u,v
w(x)
Now, observe that ∑x6∈S′,x6=u,vw(x) ≥ ∑x∈U w(x)−∑x∈S′ w(x)−w(u)−w(v) ≥ 3k/2− k = k/2. This means
that ∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1 P
U\{u,v}[S]≥∑u,v6∈S,|S′ |=k−2P
U\{u,v}[S′] k
2(k−1) ≥ 0.5. Thus, we have that
∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−2P
U\{u,v}[S]
∑u,v6∈S,|S|=k−1P
U\{u,v}[S]
≤
2. Thus, we have that η2 ≤ 12. We define α2 in the theorem statement based on this value.
Now, there are four components we must prove: (1) that the conditioning mechanism is α1-individually
fair, (2) the mechanism terminates quickly, (3) the mechanism satisfies α2-Notion 2 and (4) when ∑x∈U w(x)=
3k/2, then |p(u)− p(v)| ≥ |w(u)−w(v)|C and 0.5(1− e−k/36− e−k/54)w(u)≤ p(u) ≤ α1w(u).
(1) α1-Individual Fairness: We apply Proposition D.6, and obtain that the mechanism is η1-individually
fair. We set α1 to be the bounds on η1 given above.
(2) Bounding the number of rounds in expectation: Let T be the expected number of rounds. In (1),
we showed that the probability of success is at least P[|S| ≥ k]≥ 1− e−
k
12 . Thus, we know that the expected
number of rounds, T = 1
P[|S|≥k] = η1. We thus know that T ≥ α1.
(3) α2-Notion 2: We apply Proposition D.6, and obtain that the mechanism satisfies η2-Notion 2. Using
the bounds on η2 from above yields the desired result.
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(4)∑x∈U w(x) tuned to 3k/2: We apply Proposition D.6, and obtain that p(u)=w(u)∑u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S] ·
k
|S|+1) and |p(u)− p(v)| =
|w(u)−w(v)|∑S⊆U,|S|≥kP
U\{u,v}[S] k
|S|+1
∑S⊆U,|S|≥kP
U [S]
.
First, we bound p(u). Observe that ∑u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S] · k|S|+1) ≤ ∑u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S]) ≤ 1, so
p(u) ≤ η1w(u). We now show that when ∑x∈U w(x) = 3k/2, it holds that p(u) ≥ 0.5(1− e
−k/36− e−k/54).
We observe that
∑
u6∈S,|S|≥k−1
(PU\{u}[S]
k
|S|+1
)≥ 0.5 ∑
u6∈S,|S|≥k−1,|S|≤2k−1
(PU\{u}[S])
≥ 0.5
(
1−
(
∑
u/∈S,|S|≥k−2
PU\{u}[S]
)
−
(
∑
u/∈S,|S|≥2k
PU\{u}[S]
))
.
Thus, it suffices to lower bound
0.5
(
1−
(
∑
u/∈S,|S|≤k−2
PU\{u}[S]
)
−
(
∑
u/∈S,|S|≥2k
PU\{u}[S]
))
,
for which we just need to upper bound ∑u/∈S,|S|≤k−2P
U\{u}[S] and ∑u/∈S,|S|≥2kP
U\{u}[S]. Our main tool is
Theorem D.7 (a multiplicative Chernoff bound) with δ = 1/3. Here, µ = ∑x∈U,x6=uw(x). We use that
k/2≤ 3k/2−1≤ µ ≤ 3k/2. We see that
∑
u/∈S,|S|≤k−2
PU\{u}[S]≤ ∑
u/∈S,|S|≤k−2/3
PU\{u}[S]≤ ∑
u/∈S,|S|≤2µ/3
PU\{u}[S]≤ e−
k
36 .
Using that k/2≤ µ ≤ 3k/2, we see that
∑
u/∈S,|S|≥2k
PU\{u}[S]≤ ∑
u/∈S,|S|≥4µ/3
PU\{u}[S]≤ e−
k
54 .
Thus, we have that p(u) ≥ ∑u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S] · k|S|+1 )≥ 0.5(1− e
−k/36− e−k/54)w(u).
Now, we bound |p(u)− p(v)|. We show that When ∑x∈U w(x) = 3k/2, it holds that |p(u)− p(v)| ≥
|w(u)−w(v)|0.5(1− e−k/36− e−k/54). We observe that
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1
PU\{u,v}[S] · k
|S|+1
≥ 0.5 ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥k−1,|S|≤2k−1
(PU\{u,v}[S])
≥ 0.5
(
1−
(
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≤k−2
PU\{u,v}[S]
)
−
(
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥2k
PU\{u,v}[S]
))
.
Thus, it suffices to lower bound
0.5
(
1−
(
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≤k−2
PU\{u,v}[S]
)
−
(
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥2k
PU\{u,v}[S]
))
,
for which we just need to upper bound ∑u,v6∈S,|S|≤k−2P
U\{u,v}[S] and ∑u,v6∈S,|S|≥2k P
U\{u,v}[S]. Our main tool
is Theorem D.7 (a multiplicative Chernoff bound) with δ = 1/3. Here, µ = ∑x∈U,x6=u,vw(x). We use that
k/2≤ 3k/2−2≤ µ ≤ 3k/2. We see that
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≤k−2
PU\{u,v}[S]≤ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≤k−4/3
PU\{u,v}[S]≤ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≤2µ/3
PU\{u,v}[S]≤ e−
k
36 .
Using that k/2≤ µ ≤ 3k/2, we see that
∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥2k
PU\{u,v}[S]≤ ∑
u,v6∈S,|S|≥4µ/3
PU\{u,v}[S]≤ e−
k
54 .
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Thus, we have that |p(u)− p(v)| ≥ |w(u)−w(v)|∑u6∈S,|S|≥k−1(P
U\{u}[S] · k|S|+1 )≥ 0.5(1− e
−k/36− e−k/54).
We can bound 0.5(1− e−k/36− e−k/54). We define α3 in the theorem statement based on such bounds.

D.4. Proofs for Section 4.2. For convenience, we restate the quality composition mechanism (Mechanism
4.12):
Mechanism D.8 (Restatement of the Quality Compositional Mechanisms). Let β ≤ 1 be a constant, and sup-
pose that D endowed with quality groups q1, . . . ,qn is β -quality-clustered. Suppose also that C is quality-
symmetric. For each 1≤ i≤ n and each 1≤ xi ≤ |qi|, let Ai,xi be a D
i-individually fair mechanism selecting
xi individuals in qi. We define the quality compositional mechanism for {Ai,xi} as follows. Let X be any
distribution over n-tuples of nonnegative integers (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ P(C ).
(1) Draw (x1, . . . ,xn)∼X .
(2) Independently run Ai,xi for each 1≤ i≤ n, and return the union of the outputs of all of these mecha-
nisms.
We prove Lemma 4.13, also restated here:
Lemma D.9 (Restatement of Lemma 4.13). Let β ≤ 0.5 be a constant, and suppose that D endowed with
quality groups q1, . . . ,qn is β -quality-clustered. Suppose also that C is quality-symmetric, and let X be any
distribution over (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ P(C ) such that |
xi
|qi|
−
x j
|q j |
| ≤ (1−2β )D(i, j). If A is a quality compositional
mechanism, then:
(1) A is always individually fair.
(2) A always satisfies 0.5-Notion 1.
(3) A satisfies 0.5-Notion 2 for D and δF if either of the following conditions hold:
(a) (One set) |Supp(X )|= 1 (i.e. one “canonical” (x1, . . . ,xn)), or
(b) (0-1 metric) D(i, j) = 1 for 1≤ i 6= j ≤ n and D i(u,v) = 0 for 1≤ i≤ n.
Proof. First, we handle a single quality profile vector. Then, we show (1) and (2). Lastly, we show (3).
Handling a single quality profile vector. For (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Supp(X ), let p
(x1,...,xn)(u) be the probability
that u is assigned to a cohort if a quality compositional mechanism is run on the distribution X ′ with
probability 1 at (x1, . . . ,xn). We claim that |p
(x1,...,xn)(u)− p(x1 ,...,xn)(v)| ≤D(u,v). If u and v are in the same
quality group, then individual fairness follows from the individual fairness of Mi,ci .
Suppose that u and v are in different quality groups, say qi and q j. Note that ∑x∈qi p
(x1,...,xn)(x) = xi
and ∑x∈q j p
(x1,...,xn)(x) = x j. WLOG suppose that p
(x1,...,xn)(u) ≥ p(x1,...,xn)(i). Let u′ be an individual in qi
maximally distant from u and let v′ be an individual in q j maximally distant from v. Then, we know that for
each x ∈ qi, it holds that p
(x1,...,xn)(x)≥ p(x1,...,xn)(u)−D(u,x) ≥ p(u)−D(u,u′). Similarly, for each x ∈ q j,
it holds that p(x) ≤ p(x1,...,xn)(v)+D(v,x) ≤ p(x1,...,xn)(v)+D(v,v′).
Thus, we know that xi = ∑x∈qi p
(x1,...,xn)(x) ≥ |qi|(p
(x1,...,xn)(u)−D(u,u′)). This means that
xi
|qi|
≥ p(x1,...,xn)(u)−D(u,u′),
and so:
p(x1,...,xn)(u) ≤
xi
|qi|
+D(u,u′).
Similarly, note that x j = ∑x∈q j p
(x1,...,xn)(x) ≤ |q j|(p(v)+D(v,v
′)). Thus we have
x j
|q j |
≤ p(x1,...,xn)(v)+
D(v,v′), and so:
p(x1,...,xn)(v) ≥
x j
|q j|
−D(v,v′).
Putting these facts together, we obtain that:
p(x1,...,xn)(u)− p(x1,...,xn)(v)≤
xi
|qi|
+D(u,u′)−
(
x j
|q j|
−D(v,v′)
)
=
xi
|qi|
−
x j
|q j|
+D(u,u′)+D(v,v′).
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We know that xi|qi|
−
x j
|q j |
≤ (1− 2β ) since this is given in the theorem statement. Since D is β -quality-
clustered, we know that D(u,u′)≤ βD(i, j) and D(v,v′)≤ βD(i, j). Thus, the whole expression is bounded
by D(u,v).
Showing (1) and (2). Now to show (1) and (2), we essentially combine this with the fact that the quality
compositional mechanism borrows features of RandomizeThenClassify in [6]. Let γ be the probability mea-
sure corresponding toX . Pick a pair of individuals u and v. Let the cluster label of the cluster corresponding
to (x1, . . . ,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv) be i((x1, . . . ,xn)). First, we letC=∑(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv) |γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(u)−
γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(v)| and observe that:
C = ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
|γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(u)− γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(v)|
= ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
γ((x1, . . . ,xn))|p
(x1,...,xn)(u)− p(x1,...,xn)(v)|
≤ ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
γ((x1, . . . ,xn))D(u,v)
≤D(u,v).
We use this to show that
TV (qu,v,qv,u) = 0.5
nu,v
∑
i=1
|q2u,v(i)−q
2
v,u(i)|
= ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
|q2u,v(i((x1, . . . ,xn)))−q
2
v,u(i((x1, . . . ,xn)))|
= ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
|γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(u)− γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(v)|
=C
≤D(u,v),
proving (2). We similarly see that:
|p(u)− p(v)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
|γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(u)− γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ∑
(x1,...,xn)∈P(Cu∪Cv)
|γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(u)− γ((x1, . . . ,xn))p
(x1,...,xn)(v)
=C
≤D(u,v),
thus proving (1).
Showing (3). We now show (3). For (3a), pick any pair of individuals u and v. Observe that the partition
corresponding to u and v in the mapping has a single cluster. Thus, TV (q1u,v,q
1
v,u) = 0.5|p(u)− p(v)| ≤
D(u,v), using the individual fairness of a quality compositional mechanism given by (1). For (3b), pick
any pair of individuals u and v. If D(u,v) = 1, then there is no condition on u and v in 0.5-Notion 2, so
it trivially holds. If D(u,v) < 1, then we know that u and v are in the same quality group (say qi) and
D(u,v) = 0. By (1), we know that the quality compositional mechanism is individually fair so p(u) = p(v).
Consider an arbitrary cluster, say cluster j. Since the mechanisms Ai,xi are individually fair, and since C is
quality-symmetric, we know that it must true that q2u,v(i) =
∑C∈Cu |Mu,v(C)= jA(C)
p(u) =
∑C∈Cv|Mu,v(C)= jA(C)
p(v) = q
2
v,u( j).
Thus, TV (q2u,v,q
2
v,u) = 0 as desired.

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APPENDIX E. PROOFS FOR SECTION 2
We now show that conditional robustness implies unconditional robustness up to a Lipschitz constant.
Proposition E.1. Suppose that f is an individually fair post-processing function and A is an individually
fair cohort-selection mechanism.
(1) If
{
S
A, f
u
}
u∈U
is α-Lipschitz individually fair w.r.t dcond,E, then
{
S
A, f
u
}
u∈U
is (α +1)-Lipschitz indi-
vidually fair w.r.t duncond,E.
(2) If
{
S
A, f
u
}
u∈U
is α-Lipschitz individually fair w.r.t dcond,MMD , then
{
S
A, f
u
}
u∈U
is (α + 1)-Lipschitz
individually fair w.r.t duncond,MMD .
Proof. First, we prove (1). Since
{
S
A, f
u
}
u∈U
is α-Lipschitz individually fair w.r.t dcond,E, we know that∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
A(C)
p(u)
f (C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
A(C)
p(v)
f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ αD(u,v)
and
|p(u)− p(v)| ≤D(u,v).
It suffices to show that∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
A(C) f (C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
A(C) f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (α +1)D(u,v).
Notice that the first condition is equivalent to∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
p(v)A(C)
p(u)p(v)
f (C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
A(C)p(u)
p(u)p(v)
f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ αD(u,v)∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(u)A(C) f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)
| ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,v)+ ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,v)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(u)A(C) f (C,v)|
≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)
In the previous line we added and subtracted the term ∑C∈C ,v∈C p(v)A(C) f (C,v). Now, we use the fact
that |A|− |B|= |A|− |−B| ≤ |A+B| by the triangle inequality. This implies that∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(v)A(C) f (C,v)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
p(u)A(C) f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)
p(v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
A(C)F(C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
A(C) f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)+ |p(v)− p(u)|
(
∑
C∈C ,v∈C
f (C,v)A(C)
)
≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)+ |p(v)− p(u)|
(
∑
C∈C ,v∈C
A(C)
)
≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)+ p(v)D(u,v)∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
C∈C ,u∈C
A(C)F(C,u)− ∑
C∈C ,v∈C
A(C) f (C,v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α p(u)p(v)D(u,v)+D(u,v)p(v)p(v) = (1+α p(u))D(u,v)
≤ (α + 1)D(u,v).
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Now, we prove (2). Recall that we have mass-moving guarantees for the conditional case, i.e. that
MMD(SC,A, fu ,S
C,A, f
v ) = d′ for some d′. Pick ε > 0 and let d = d′+ ε . By the definition of mass-moving
distance, we know that there exist probability measures with finite support γ˜Cu and γ˜
C
v over [0,1] that achieve
the value of d in the mass-moving distance definition. The problem that we now we need to solve boils to
handling the extra mass at 0 in the unconditional distributions. We let γ˜Nu (x) = p(u)γ˜
C
u (x) for x 6= 0 and we
let γ˜N(0) = (1− p(u))+ p(u)γ˜C(0). We define γ˜Nv (x) analogously. Now, we use γ˜
N
u and γ˜
N
v to upper bound
MMD(S
N,A, f
u ,S
N,A, f
v ). First, we see that γ˜Nu and γ˜
N
v have finite support. For condition (2), we let Z
′
u(i) = Zu(i)
for i 6= 0. If p(u) = 1, we let Z′u(0) = Zu(0) and otherwise, we let Z
′
u(0) have a mass of
S
C,A, f
u (0)+z
0
u(0)
1−p(u)+p(u)SC,A, fu (0)
at
0 and have a mass of
z0u(i)
1−p(u)+p(u)S
C,A, f
u (0)
at i 6= 0 ∈ Supp(γ˜Nu ), where z
0
u is the pmf of the distribution Zu(0). It
is straightforward to verify that condition (2) is satisfied.
Thus, we just need to verify condition (1). First, we consider modified measures (not probability mea-
sures), where γ˜Mu (x) = p(u)γ˜
C
u (x) for all x. We see that the only difference is that there is no extra mass of
1− p(u) on 0 (analogously for γ˜Mv ). Observe that
TV (γ˜Nu , γ˜
N
v )≤ TV (γ˜
M
u , γ˜
M
v )+0.5|1− p(u)− (1− p(v))| ≤ TV (γ˜
M
u , γ˜
M
v )+0.5D(u,v).
We now show that TV (γ˜Mu , γ˜
M
v )≤ d+0.5D(u,v). We know that
0.5∑ |γ˜Cu (s)− γ˜Cv (s)| ≤ d
0.5∑ |
γ˜Mu (s)
p(u)
−
γ˜Mv (s)
p(v)
| ≤ d
0.5∑ |
p(v)γ˜Mu (s)
p(u)p(v)
−
p(u)γ˜Mv (s)
p(u)p(v)
| ≤ d
0.5∑ |p(v)γ˜Mu (s)− p(u)γ˜Mv (s)| ≤ dp(u)p(v)
0.5∑ |p(v)γ˜Mu (s)− p(v)γ˜Mv (s)+ p(v)γ˜Mv (s)− p(u)γ˜Mv (s)| ≤ dp(u)p(v).
Now, we use the fact that |A|− |B|= |A|− |−B| ≤ |A+B| by the triangle inequality. This implies that
0.5∑(|p(v)γ˜Mu (s)− p(v)γ˜Mv (s)|− |p(v)γ˜Mv (s)− p(u)γ˜Mv (s)|)≤ dp(u)p(v)
0.5∑(p(v)|γ˜Mu (s)− γ˜Mv (s)|− γ˜Mv (s)|p(v)− p(u)|) ≤ dp(u)p(v)
0.5∑ p(v)|γ˜Mu (s)− γ˜Mv (s)| ≤ α1p(u)p(v)D(u,v)+0.5∑ γ˜Mv (s)|p(v)− p(u)|
0.5p(v)∑ |γ˜Mu (s)− γ˜Mv (s)| ≤ dp(u)p(v)+0.5D(u,v)∑ γ˜Mu (s)
0.5∑ |γ˜Mu (s)− γ˜Mv (s)| ≤
dp(u)p(v)+0.5D(u,v)p(v)
p(v)
= dp(u)+0.5D(u,v)
≤ d+0.5D(u,v).
Since
{
S
A, f
u
}
u∈U
is α-Lipschitz individually fair w.r.t dcond,MMD , we know that d′ ≤ αD(u,v). Thus, we
know that for every ε > 0, we can set v equal to D(u,v)+ (d′+ ε)+D(u,v) ≤ (α + 1)D(u,v)+ ε . This
gives the desired statement. 
Next, we show that mass moving distance is at least as strong as expected score (up to Lipschitz con-
stants).
Proposition E.2. Consider distributions X1,X2 ∈ ∆([0,1]). Then, |E[X1]−E[X2]| ≤ 3MMD(X1,X2).
Proof. We know that
|E[X1]−E[X2]| ≤ |E[X1]−E[X˜1]|+ |E[X˜1]−E[X˜2]|+ |E[X2]−E[X˜2]|.
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Let d′ =MMD(X1,X2). For ε > 0, let d = d
′+ ε . Then, by the definition of mass-moving distance, we
know that there exist probability measures (can be viewed as distributions) X˜1 and X˜2) that achieve d. By
condition (2) in the mass-moving distance definition, we know that TV (X˜1,X˜2) ≤ d. This means that the
ℓ1 distance is at most 2d. Since scores are in [0,1], this implies that |E[D˜1]−E[D˜2]| ≤ 2d. For the first and
last terms, we use condition (3) in the definition of mass-moving distance. We see that |E[Xi]−E[X˜i]| ≤
0.5d, and this means that |E[X1]−E[X2]| ≤ 3(d
′+ ε). Taking the limit as ε → 0, this gives the desired
answer. 
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